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ABSTRACT

In recent times, there has been a proliferation of laws
enacted by individual states and townships which restrict the
ability of mariners to anchor within navigable waters of the
united states. These laws have been enacted in many of the
coastal states, but are most prevalent in California, Florida
and Hawaii. Uncertainty as to whether anchoring is an act of
navigation, thereby being a constitutional right, has resulted
in

confusion

among boaters,

legal

authorities

and

policy

makers. In an attempt to clarify the uncertainty surrounding
this issue,

a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of

anchoring laws within the state of Hawaii has come before the
public eye. Although the Hawaiian lawsuit is focused solely
upon anchoring laws which affect that state,

the ultimate

outcome of the case could set precedent for this issue on a
national basis.
As

case

history has

been

unhelpfully

silent

in

the

resolution of the anchoring issue, primary legal doctrines,
such as the united states Constitution,

the pub I ic trust

doctrine and legal traditions practiced since the Institutes
of

Justinian

guidelines.
agencies,

law

must

provide

some

of

the

essential

Also of importance are the opinions of federal
such

as

the

Coast

Guard,

and

Army

Corps

of

engineers.
The following study addresses the current state of the
ii

anchoring conflict,

explains the importance of a solution,

examines the documents which affect the issue, and proposes
conclusions based on logic, history, and the guidelines set
forth in the surveyed primary data. The conclusions support
the proposals that anchoring can be proven to be an act of
navigation, laws which restrict anchoring likewise restrict
constitutional rights, and that anchoring laws may be deemed
to be unconstitutional.

iii
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CHAPl'ER I: THE ANCHORING CONFLICT

A. Intoduction

Across

the nation,

the headlines

resound:

"Anchoring

Rights Topic of Conference"l, "N.Y. Boaters Form Rights Group
In

Response

To

Challenged,,3,
Aims

To

address

Block

Anchoring

Limits,,2,

"Anchoring Rules
Tough

problems

New

which

"Mooring

coming,,4,

Anchorage
have

and

Law". 5

emerged

Ordinance

"Hawaii suit
The

from

headlines
recent

a

proliferation of state-imposed anchorage laws.
A number of coastal states have recently enacted laws
which restrict

free

anchoring

in navigable waters

of the

United States. 6 Uncertainty as to whether anchoring

is a

constitutional right has resulted in confusion among boaters,
legal authorities and policy makers. As a result, conflicts
have occurred and the constitutionality of laws which impose

1 Soundings, December, 1992.
2 Soundings, June, 1993.
3 Sarasota Herald-Tribune, September 17, 1990.
4 Soundings, December, 1992.
5 Soundings, January, 1993.
6 Jim Flannery, "Anchoring Rules Coming", soundings,
December, 1992.
1

restrictions on free anchoring has been questioned. 7
Anchoring laws often originate through state legislation
which has been established either to regulate environmental
resources,
navigation. 8

or

delineate

state

state

legislation

power
over

over

marine

waters

and

resources

is

established through the SUbmerged Lands Act of 1953. 9 The Act
grants paramount authority to the state, with the exception
that

the

federal

government

retains

its

navigation

servitude,10 for the "constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation,

national defense and

international affairs. ,,11

At this juncture, it is important to distinguish between
two maritime terms Which, because of their similarities, may
be a potential source of confusion during SUbsequent stages of
the analysis. In particular, these terms are "anchoring" and
"mooring". "Anchoring" entails the use of an anchor or similar
weight to prevent a vessel from moving significantly over an
7 Flannery, "Hawaii suit to block tough new anchorage
law", Soundings, January, 1993. The case in question,
Hawaiian Navigable waters Preservation Society v. State of
Hawaii 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993), challenges the
constitutionality of Hawaiian anchorage laws.
8 Id. at 53.

9 SUbmerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C., Sec. 1314 et. seq.
10 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 147. The
navigation servitude is the paramount right of the federal
government, under the Commerce Clause of the u.S.
Constitution to compel the removal of any obstruction to
navigation.
11 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C., Sec. 1314.
2

area of submerged land to which the vessel is affixed by means
of such anchor, weight, chain and length of rope. The anchor,
or weight is typically carried aboard such vessel when the
vessel is not anchored.
"Mooring" entails the act of securing a vessel over an
area of sUbmerged land by means of affixing such vessel to an
anchor or weight which is permanently,
located on such submerged land.

or semi-permanently

This anchor,

or weight is

refered to as a "mooring". Moorings are typically installed
and maintained by individuals or state agencies which have
been granted permits to install and collect revenues from such
moorings.

The following

research is concerned solely with

state-imposed laws which place restrictions on anchoring.
The constitutionality of state-imposed regulations and
restrictions on anchoring was recently challenged in a class
action suit initiated by a boater interest group against the
state

of

Hawaii. 12

The

case,

Hawaiian

Preservation Society v. state of Hawaii,
was heard before the U. S.

Navigable

Waters

(HNWPS v. Hawaii),

District Court for the State of

Hawaii on March 5, 1993. The court upheld the authority of the
state in imposing restrictions on anchoring. 1 3 Shortly after
the

District Court decision,

appeal,

and

although

a

the plaintiffs

hearing

date

has

filed
not

for

yet

12 Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society
state of Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993).
13 Id.
3

an

been

v.

determined, the case will be heard in the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals,

in San Francisco,

California .14 This case is the

only one to date in which the constitutionality of anchoring
laws has been, and continues to be challenged.
There are various statutes,

legal doctrines and legal

opinions which constitute the primary guidelines along which
the question of jurisdiction (and hence the constitutionality)
of

anchoring

laws

may be

Submerged Lands Act,

resolved. 15

These

include

the navigation servitude,

the

the pub Li.c

trust doctrine,16 and a legal opinion submitted by the Coast
Guard on matters concerning federal versus state regulation of
anchoring. 17
The SUbmerged Lands Act provides the basis upon which
states have enacted laws which regulate anchoring. States are
limited in their authority by federal preemption in regulating
matters

concerning

navigation servitude.

navigation,

as

established

in

the

If state regulations do not trespass

14 HNWPS v. Hawaii, civil Docket, u.S. District Court
For the District of Hawaii, Nov 4, 1993: 8.
15 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. SUpp. 766; 1993. Some of the
sources examined by the District Court include the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, the Commerce Clause, the January, 1993
Coast Guard legal opinion, various Hawaiian session Laws,
the Equal Protection Clause, and various legal cases.
16 Mark Amaral and Virginia Lee, Public Rights to
Coastal Waters: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine, Rhode
Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1992: xxi. Traditional
rights enjoyed by the pUblic within pUblic trust areas are
those of fishing, fOWling, navigation and recreation.
17 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. State
RegUlation", Dec. 30, 1992.
4

within the boundaries of the federal navigation servitude,
then such state regulations may be permissible. However, if
anchoring is an act associated with navigation,

then laws

which regulate anchoring may be sUbject to federal preemption.

In January, 1993, the Commandant's office of the Coast
Guard released a

legal

opinion in which

it addressed

its

position with regard to federal versus state regUlation of
anchoring. The Coast Guard took the position that it had joint
jurisdiction

with

the

validity

the

Coast

of

states
Guard

over

navigable

opinion

has

waters.

recently

The
been

questioned, as evidenced by the fact that Rep. Gerry Studds,
Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
has ordered a congressional review of the document. 18 There
is sUbstantial evidence indicating that it may be the Army
Corps of Engineers that is responsible for monitoring some
matters which affect navigation. 1 9
The Public Trust Doctrine reserves certain constitutional
rights for the general pUblic. Historically, the common law
rights of the public in public trust lands and waters are
18 Id. Also telephone interview with Joan Bondareff,
Coast Guard Group, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Washington, D.C., (202) 226-3500, March 30, 1994.
Bondareff indicated that the congressional review has not
yet occurred and that no date has been set for such review.
19 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 171. Congress,
through various acts, has granted to the Secretary of the
Army the powers to maintain the navigability of the waters
of the United States. In turn, the Secretary of the Army has
delegated that responsibility to the Corps.
5

related to "commerce, fishing

recreation and navigation.,,20

Each state holds a public trust interest in its areas which
are

deemed

as

being

navigable. 21

it

Thus,

is

the

responsibility of the state to assure the pUblic of its rights
to the same areas.
impinges

upon

navigation

and

If a

law which is enacted by a state

established

pUblic

recreation,

such

trust
a

rights,

law

may

such

be

as

deemed

~nconstitutional.

As yet, no legal precedent has been established to define
the parameters of anchoring laws
federal

navigation

servitude

or

in association with the
the

public

rights

of

navigation and recreation. Likewise, the question of whether
regulatory authority should fall into state or federal hands
has not been clearly answered. Only after these questions have
been addressed shall

it be possible to determine whether

anchoring laws are permissible state activities, or in fact
unconstitutional encroachments on federal and pUblic rights.

20 Mark Amaral and Virginia Lee, Public Rights to
Coastal Waters, "Applying the Public Trust Doctrine", Rhode
Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1992: xxi.
21 Id.
6

B. Scope of the Problem

As the proliferation of anchoring laws continues, there
has been a considerable backlash in the form. of a negative
response to such laws among the boating community. This has
resulted
activist

in

the

informative

groups,

confrontations,
editorials

establishment

and

of

boater-rights-oriented
publications 2 2,

legal defense groups,

and an outpouring of

statements

official

legal

challenging

the

constitutionality of such laws.
The extent to which some activist groups have expressed
dissatisfaction

with

anchorage

laws

may

be

seen

in

the

following excerpt from an editorial written by Edwin Hager,
founder of Boater Rights, a group based in Bradenton, Florida:

With complete disregard for state and Federal laws ... the
Longboat Key Town Commission is once again trying to
rewrite both state and Federal law.
[A] Proposed
ordinance [regulating] Anchored Vessels and Liveaboards
is nothing more than another unconstitutional attempt to
take away the rights of the public .... My ancestors died
in bloody wars to defend the Constitution and the freedom
that we claim as citizens of the United states. How can
I accept these freedoms without the same conviction?23

22 One example of an "informative pUblication" is Harry
Phillips' Your Right To Anchor, Analemma House, Lake Park,
Fla. 1988. The pUblication takes a quasi-legal approach
towards constitutional factors involved in anchoring rights.
23 Edwin Hager, Editorial sent to and subsequently
printed in The Longboat Observer, Aug. 23, 1990.
7

The almost militant style with which Hager expresses his
conviction against laws which may impinge upon constitutional
rights is likewise reflected in a periodical distributed by
the Sailors Total Anchoring Rights Society (STARS):

... AII boaters have the right to use our federal waters
system without the harassment of the local police and
without the invalid ordinances that are being written to
usurp these rights. The only way we are going to gain
these rights is to SUE THE BASTARDS! ... We are going to
find each ordinance that is attempting to limit the
rights of boaters to anchor and otherwise use our federal
waters~ and we are going to file suit in ... a federal
court. 4
While

boater

interest

groups

have

expressed

a

considerable amount of sentiment against state-imposed laws
restricting anchoring,

riparian land owners have expressed

opinions commensurate in fervor with those of the boaters, yet
in the opposite extreme. Although research has not indicated
the existence of any riparian land owner interest groups, some
of the opinions of this obviously interested group may be
taken into account, again, through pUblished editorials. The
following excerpt is indicative of one riparian land owner's
point of view:

[With regard to anchoring laws] ... I can see a 24-hour
limit on anchoring in some areas and pretty much a
maximum of 72 hours in other less populated places. Here
in Florida we've all seen some rather scruffy live
aboard-on-the-cheap types that you would not want

24 Harry Phillips, STARS, Winter, 1989, Vol. 1 No. IV:
2-3.
8

anchored in your backyard. 2 5
This point of view is echoed in the following excerpt from a
letter which appeared in the same pUblication:
I, for one, think that tougher laws are required for
anchoring especially in southeast Florida due to the
crack-pot mentality of these sailboat owners. If the
local municipalities let these people have their way, no
one would be able to navigate the ICW [Intracoastal
Waterway] without running into an illegally anchored
sailboat .... I will continue to push for stronger laws to
prohibit all overnight anchoring in the ICW and maybe the
outright banning of all sailboats. 2 6
As it can be seen, a radical difference exists between
the points of view of both boater-rights interest groups and
riparian

land

expressing

owners.

their

views

While both parties may be
in

the

extreme,

these

seen as

views

are

ultimately heard by local, state and federal legislators, and
playa major role in the subsequent establishment of laws. It
is the obligation of the state,
Management Act

(CZMA),

through the Coastal Zone

"to preserve,

protect,

develop,

and

where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of the
nation's coastal zone ... ,,27 Typically, this is accomplished
through proper coastal

zone management.

In theory,

proper

coastal zone management assures that all pUblic and private

25 Resident of EI Jobean, Fla., Boat U.S. Reports, Vol.
XXVIII, May, 1993: 6.
26 Id.
27 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. Sec.
303: 1.
9

interests

are

relative

to

taken
the

into

account

coastal

zone.

while

examining

Ultimately,

the

issues

goal

of

lawmakers involved in coastal zone management is to strike a
balance,

wherein

all

parties

involved

may

be

appeased.

Unfortunately, as is often the case, the affected parties may
not always be completely satisfied with the decisions of the
lawmakers.
While both state and local authorities have typically
assumed

active

roles

in

coastal

zone

management

and

the

anchoring conflict, the involvement of Federal agencies has
typically been characterized as one of detached observation.
This is evidenced in part by Executive Order 12612 of 26,
1987. 28 This order on "federalism" mandates that

October,

all Federal agencies are to avoid the assertion of preemption
of

state

and

local

government

action.

Under

this

Order,

Federal agencies may commence preemption claims only where a
Federal statute contains an express preemption provision or
where there is clear evidence that Congress intended to so
preempt. 29
As

of

yet,

the

only

Federal

agency

which

has

been

continually involved in the anchoring issue has been the U.S.
Coast Guard. Although the Coast Guard has been involved to the
extent of following up on correspondence and issuing legal
opinions, it has still taken more of a passive, rather than
28 Executive Order #12612, "Federalism", Oct. 26, 1987.
29

rd.
10

active role in conflict resolution. This may be seen in the
following Coast Guard statements:
[In reference to direct Coast Guard intervention in the
anchoring conflict] The Coast Guard's long-standing
policy not to assume a legal position when a state
proposes to regulate, restrict, or prohibit navigation
except in situations that lead to direct conflict with
Federal laws and regulations administered and enforced by
the Coast Guard will continue. 3 0
... It is more appropriate for issues such as whether the
state action [in regulating anchoring] is prohibited by
the supremacy clause of the constitution to be resolved
by the courts or through state political processes
[rather than through Coast Guard intervention].31

As it can be seen, the ongoing conflict concerning laws
which impose restrictions on anchoring in the navigable waters
of the United states is one which has been characterized by
multiple,

oftentimes divergent points of view.

It has also

been punctuated by both legal challenges and opinions. The
crux of the anchoring conflict ultimately lies in the relation
of anchoring to navigation. Once a definition of anchoring in
relation to navigation is legally established, a significant
milestone will have been reached in the struggle to resolve
anchoring conflicts.

30 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 3.
31 Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District, Memorandum
#16636, serial: 0874, June, 1991.
11

c. Advantages of Resolution
The anchoring conflict has been selected as the sUbject
of this study for two reasons: its relevance to the field of
marine affairs and its current development as a controversial
issue

in

constitutional

law .

within

the

scope

of marine

affairs, anchoring laws fall into the more specific category
of coastal zone management. Interests in the coastal zone are
both wide and varied, so that the intrinsic nature of coastal
zone

management

is

to

provide

attempting to meet these needs.
legislation

does

not

some

sort

of

balance

Needless to say,

always

completely

in

existing

meet

every

constituent's needs, and the result often takes the form of
conflicts such as those Which currently exist between boater
groups and the state of Hawaii. In this respect, coastal zone
management may be the most effective means by which to resolve
these differences.
One
currently

of

the

elements

developing

of

case

the

study

involving

a

is

a

focus

challenge

on

to

a

the

constitutionality of existing laws. As these laws deal with
marine-related

issues,

the

outcome

will

be

of

major

significance to both the fields of maritime and constitutional
law. Ultimately this study may aid in the compilation of data
which could prove to be helpful in the resolution of such
issues.
12

The

first

objective

of

this

study

is

to

provide

a

comprehensive review of the anchoring conflict and establish
its relationship with the Submerged Lands Act, the Commerce
Clause (navigation servitude) and the Public Trust Doctrine.
The second objective is to clarify the question of Coast Guard
vs.

Army

issues.

Corps

of

Engineers

jurisdiction

over

anchoring

This will be accomplished subsequent to the third

Objective,

which

is to both clarify and substantiate the

definition of navigation and, more specifically, to consider
how anchoring may be associated with such a definition. The
final objective is to provide an opinion, based on a review of
available precedents,

as to whether anchoring

regulations

should Ultimately be upheld as a state matter, or be deemed to
be

an

unconstitutional

restriction

on

pUblic

rights

or

interstate commerce.
The national focus is on HNWPS v. Hawaii, thereby making
it the case from which evaluation and judgement applicable to
other states shall be derived. Conclusions within the study
will be drawn independent of the outcome of the case; a legal
question of such magnitude could remain in the courts for
years, and it is the researcher's intent to forecast, rather
than report on possible outcomes. The study will describe the
current state of anchorage laws and the conflicts which have
arisen since their establishment. The study shall go on to
explain

why

conflicts

exist,

and

how

existing

federal

legislation has resulted in confusion as to whether anchoring
13

is a pUblic right or a compensatory privilege. Ultimately, the
compilation

of

data

within

the

research

will

enable

the

researcher to accurately judge who should have authority to
regulate anchoring: the states, or the federal government.

14

D. statement of Hypotheses

In

order

to

support

the

research,

the

following

hypotheses will be tested:
1. Anchoring can be proven to be an act of navigation.
2. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in HNWPS
v. Hawaii unnecessarily restrict interstate commerce.
3. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in HNWPS
v. Hawaii unnecessarily restrict public rights associated with
the pUblic trust doctrine.
4. state-imposed anchorage laws which unnecessarily restrict
interstate commerce or pub l.I.c trust rights will be deemed
unconstitutional.

15

D. Anchoring as an Act of Navigation

One of the issues lying at the heart of the anchoring
conflict has to do with the definition of 'navigation', and
more

specifically,

definition.

It

the

has

relationship

already

been

of

anchoring

established

to that

that

free

navigation is ensured under federal protection. The federal
navigation servitude,
within

the

United

the offspring of the commerce clause

states

Constitution,32

gives

paramount

right to the federal government to compel the removal of any
obstruction
SUbsequently

to

navigation. 33

The

codified through

the

navigation
Submerged

servitude

is

Lands

of

Act

1953. 34 The Act, though granting jurisdictional use of said
lands to the individual states, provides that:
The United states retains all of its navigation servitude
and rights in and powers of regulation and control of
said lands for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation,
national
defense
and
international
.
a ff alrs
.... 35
Although it has already been established that navigation
is an activity associated with public trust rights, anchoring

32 The Constitution of the United States, Article 1,
section 8, Sept. 17, 1787.
33 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law: 147.
34 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43, U.S.C. Sec. 1301
et.seq.
35 Id. at 1314 (a).
16

as

a

right

under

the

pUblic

trust

doctrine

may

be

substantially reinforced by its association with navigation,
a

more traditional public trust right.

Traditional rights

enjoyed by the public in pub Li.c trust areas are those of
"fishing, fowling, navigation and recreation".36
Navigation is a federally protected constitutional right.
This

is

affirmed

through

the

navigation

servitude,

the

submerged Lands Act, and the pUblic trust doctrine. Hence, it
would follow that any statute acting as a means of hindering
or placing unnecessary burdens on free navigation would be in
violation of said provisions. Likewise, if anchoring is an act
of navigation,

statutes which hinder or place unnecessary

burdens on free anchoring would also be in violation of said
provisions.

It is the purpose of the following section to

clarify the legal definition of navigation and resolve the
question of whether or not anchoring is an act encompassed
within the definition of navigation.
'Navigate'

as defined

in Webster's New International

Dictionary, 2nd. edition, includes the following:

L. navigatus, past part. of navigare, v.t.&i., fro navis
ship k agers to move, direct ... ) Intransitive: 1. To
journey by water; to go in a vessel; to sailor navigate
a vessel; to use the waters as a highway for commerce, or
communication; ply ... 2. Hence, to direct one's course
through any medium; to steer, especially to operate an
airplane or airship. Transitive: 1. to pass over in
36 Amaral and Lee, Public Rights To Coastal Waters:
Applying The Public Trust Doctrine, Rhode Island, Coastal
Resources Center, 1992: xxi.
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vessels; to sail over or on; as, to navigate the
Atlantic;--said also of vessels; by extension, to direct
one's course through (any medium). 2. to steer direct or
manage in sailing; to conduct; hence to operate, steer,
control the course of (an airplane or airship).
It should be duly noted that nowhere in the preceding
definition is there any mention of 'anchor' or 'anchoring' as
an act of navigation. This is of no consequence, as courts
have, in the past, refused to rely on the "definition of such
a

non-maritime

pUblication"

navigation. 37 Instead,

to

define

the

parameters

of

courts have looked towards previous

case history and documents to supplement the definition of
navigation.
One of the earliest instances in which a court of the
United states attempted to define the meaning of 'navigation',
and what maritime activities are encompassed within the term,
occurred in 1838 with the case of Bowen v. Hope. 38 In this
case, the court addressed the question of whether a ship was
'at sea' at the time when her insurance policy had expired.
The vessel had been insured for a year, and if 'at sea' when
the year expired,

then the coverage of her policy was to

continue until her return to port. 39 Before the expiration
of the year, the vessel had been made ready for sea, and left
the port of Bangor, Wales, destined for Boston. After sailing
a distance of seven or eight miles, she encountered head winds
37 United states v. Monstad, 134 F.2d 986 (1943): 8.
38 Bowen v. Hope, 37 Mass. 275 (1838).
39 Id. at 2.
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and was unable to get out of the straits of Menai. There she
came to anchor, and although attempting to leave for several
days, was unable to do so. When she was finally able to make
.
. d 40
way, the year's 1nsurance
coverage h a d exp1re.
Upon arrival in Boston, the insurer made the contention
that the vessel had not been covered during the voyage as she
had

been

anchored

at

the

time

when

her

insurance

had

expired. 4 1 The court held that even though the vessel had
been anchored, she was actively engaged in navigation, and
that she was consequently 'at sea' within the meaning of her
insurance policy.42
The definition of 'navigation' was further expanded in
the

case

of The

transportation

of

Idaho,
a

in 1886. 4 3 At issue here was the

greater

number

of

passengers

by

a

steamship (the Idaho), than was permissible under the vessel's
certificate of inspection. Upon returning to port in Townsend,
Washington Territory, the vessel was seized and held liable to
fines under United states statutes. 4 4
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 3.
43 The Idaho, 29 F. 187,

(1886).

44 section 4499 of the United states Revised statutes
reads: "If any vessel, propelled in whole or in part by
steam, be navigated without complying with the terms of this
title, the owner shall be liable to the United States ... in a
penalty of $500.00 for each offense .... lt shall not be
lawful to take on board any steamer a greater number of
passengers than is stated in the certificate of
19

In defending their position, the owners of the vessel
contended

that

passengers,

and

navigation

did

hence,

court

enforce the penalty.

the

not
had

include
no

taking

on

jurisdiction to

In responding to this contention, the

court stated its opinion as to what was included within the
scope of 'navigation':
The navigation of a vessel, within the purview of this
section, includes ... everything required and provided
therefor and thereabout
in this
title ... such as
equipment, management, the character and stowage of
cargo, and the number and treatment of passengers
thereon. 45
Thus, early definitions of 'navigation' did not limit it
simply to the passage of vessels between ports, but included
acts incidental to making a journey. Taking on passengers,
stowing

their

luggage

or

cargo,

managing

a

vessel,

and

anchoring where need dictates were all held to be acts of
navigation. SUbsequently, courts have held that navigation is
not limited to the movement of a vessel upon waters, but also
includes actions which are necessary to effectuate the passage
of vessels upon waters.
In Locke v.

state,46 at issue was the collection of

reprisals by the widow of a mariner. The mariner sustained
injuries as the result of a negligent state employee, while
his boat was in a canal. The state employee had let down a
inspection ... " Id. at 5.
45 Id at 11.
46 Locke v. State, 140 N.Y.S. 480, 75 N.E. 1076,
(1894) .
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lift

bridge

on

the

mariner's

boat,

thus

causing

the

injuries. 4 7 The question was whether the injuries resulted
from the 'navigation of the canals', in which case the widow
would be granted the reprisal.
Here, the court found that, although the vessel was not
moving under its own power at the time of the accident, it was
nonetheless engaged in navigating the canals. The court stated
that:
The act of navigating fairly includes the passage of
vessels through locks, through canals, or under draw or
lift-bridges ... if any injury shall occur while passing
through a lock, through the neglect of the agent or
servant of the state ... such injury would in a just sense
result from the navigation of the canals. The man who
operates the locks and bridges in order to permit the
passage of boats upon the canal is engaged in navigating
the canal. 4 8

Thus, the meaning of 'navigation' was expanded to include
not only the movement of a vessel upon waters, but the actions
of people not even on the vessel,

affecting the vessel's

movement and safety.
In Sayer v. State,49 the court found that a vessel need
not be in motion, nor be attended in order to qualify as being
'in navigation'. At issue here was the collision of a stateowned vessel into a privately owned motorboat moored at a
slip. The collision resulted in the loss of the motorboat, the
47 Id.
48 Id. at 5.
49 Sayer v. State, 190 N.Y.S. 359,
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(1921).

owner of which subsequently filed for relief from the state
for damages. As in the previous case, the cOllision occurred
near a system of canals, however here laws did not provide for
claims arising out of "navigation of the canals".50
In dismissing the case, the court found that although the
private vessel had been moored at a slip, it was nonetheless
engaged in navigation. The court stated that:
The fact that the boat was not in motion is not
conclusive on the question. It has been held that the
word 'navigation' for some purposes includes a period
when a ship is not in motion, as for instance when she is
at anchor •.•. The motor boat, moored at the terminal, thus
was engaged in navigation ..• althou~h at the moment [of
collision] she was not in motion. 5 T
Perhaps

one

of

the

best

incorporations

of

anchoring

within the definition of navigation is derived from united
states v. Monstad. 5 2 Here, a vessel which had been anchored
for over two years was held to be lin navigation,.53 In this
case, action was brought by the United states against Jesse
Monstad, the owner of the fishing barge Kohala, to recover a

50 section 47 of the New York state Canal Laws (N.Y.S.
Consolo Laws, c. 5) provides that: "any person sustaining
damages from the canals or their ose, or from neglect of
conduct of any officers having charge of the same, or
resulting from any accident connected with the canals, may
recover under the conditions herein prescribed, such an
amount as will properly compensate him therefor .•. provided
that the provisions of this section shall not extend to
claims arising from damages resulting from the navigation of
the canals." Id. at 2-3, quoting New York state Canal Laws.
51 Id. at 4.
52 united states v. Monstad, 134 F.2d 986 (1943).
53 Id.
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penalty for having navigated the barge without a certificate
of inspection. The Kohala was a barge which had been converted
from a self-propelled vessel into a floating platform for use
by fishermen.

She was anchored by two bow anchors and one

stern anchor in the Bay of Santa Monica, California. She had
likewise been anchored there for upwards of two years before
the government commenced legal action. 54 Monstad, the owner,
contended that as the vessel was

at anchor,

she was

not

engaged in navigation, and hence did not require a certificate
of

inspection.

required

of

A certificate

vessels

engaged

of

inspection

is

in

navigation. 55

ordinarily
The

court

thought otherwise:
As so anchored by her commander, she [the Kohala] was
enabled to rise and fallon the slack of her anchor
chains with the rise and fall of the tide, and also
within the slack of the chains to move from right to left
through the water with the varying wind and tidal and
other currents of the harbor .... We do not believe that
the word 'navigate' should be confined to the moving of
a vessel from one port to another for the purposes of
transportation of goods or passengers. This vessel
necessarily must have moved from one place to another in
the water ... that is to say, she necessarily moved her
passengers across the ocean currents, and had a movement
in
them
She
is
nevertheless
engaged
in
navigation
the word ... under statute ... including the
movements of a vessel within the range of her moorings or
anchor chains. 5 6
Thus, through Monstad, the legal definition of navigation
has been expanded to include vessels lying at anchor. Of no

54 Id. at 7.
55 Id. at 6.
56 Id. at 8-9.
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lesser significance is the

fact that the vessel had been

anchored for two years without getting under way, and during
all of that time she was held to be 'in navigation,.57 This
finding is significant in that it sets precedent for vessels
to be able to anchor for at least two years without ceasing to
be 'in navigation'.
A final case linking anchoring to navigation is that of
Kuramo v.

Hamada. 58 At issue here was the contention of a

tenant of an exclusive Hawaiian fishery that he had paramount
rights

over the

water-column,

area

and

the

in question,
underlying

the

fishery within the

lands. 59

This

contention

arose when the tenant sought to prevent interference with his
exclusive

fishing

rights,

from

a

mariner who

was

in

the

practice of anchoring his vessel in the said tidal waters, and
selling bait to other fishermen. Although the court recognized
the tenant's exclusive rights to the fishery, it held that the
Territory of Hawaii owned the sUbmerged lands. As such, it was
the Territory's responsibility to ensure public rights over
the area. The court recognized navigation as a public right
and went on to state that the right of navigation includes, as
incident, the right of anchorage. GO
As it can be seen, case history indicates that the legal
57 rd. at 10.
58 Kuramo v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841 (1929).
59 rd.
GO rd.
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definition of navigation is not limited simply to the passage
of a vessel over water, as may be suggested in the definitions
provided by dictionaries. Navigation does not necessitate that
a vessel be under way, manned, or free of her mooring. Vessels
engaged in the act of anchoring,
engaged

in acts of navigation.

As

or lying at anchor,
navigation

is a

are

pub.Li,c

right, protected by the constitution (the commerce clause and
navigation servitude), the Submerged Lands Act, and the pub l Lc
trust doctrine,
included

within

it would logically follow that anchoring is
the

protective

established doctrines.

25

powers

of

these

well-

CHAPTER II: COMMON AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AFFECTING THE
ANCHORING CONFLICT

A. The Public Trust Doctrine

1) History of the Public Trust Doctrine
The pUblic trust doctrine has been called "one of the
most controversial developments in modern American law". 61
This may be partially due to the way in which it came to be
held as constitutional

law.

Public interests

in navigable

waters can be traced back to the Roman institutes of Justinian
law,
was

and the Magna carta. 6 2 Justinian law dictated that it
an individual's right to " ... build a

cottage,

dry or

repair nets, fish, or use the banks of rivers to tie boats to
trees, and to place any part of their cargo there, even though
the

banks

recogni tion

of

a

river

are

of

pub Li.c uses

private
of

the

sea

property ... "63
(and

The

subsequently

navigable waters) can also be traced back to both African and

61 Charles Wilkinson, "The headwaters of the Public
Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine", Northwestern
School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, Spring, 1989: 1.
62 Magna Carta reissue, 1225, chapter 23.
63 Amaral and Lee, Public Rights to Coastal Waters,
Rhode Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1992: xvii. "The
things which are naturally everybody's are air, flowing
water, the sea, and the sea-shore." J. Inst. 2.1.1-2.1.6 at
55 (P. Birks & G McLeod Trans., 1987.
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Native

American

cultures.

In

Nigeria,

for

example,

the

inhabitants have historically enjoyed the right "to fish the
sea and enjoy free navigation in tidal and other large inland
waterways",64 while Native American cultures wholly denied
the possibility of ownership of land, air and water. 65
Justinian law played a significant role in shaping the
foundation of what was later to become English Common law.
English Common law was then to become the most direct source
of modern American law, and hence, the pUblic trust doctrine.
Typically,

the

British

resources,

but

likewise

waterways.66
"jus

favored
made

Common law upheld

privatum"

(private

private
an

ownership

exception

a

property),

for

of

land

navigable

distinction between
which

the

King

the

could

transfer to individuals, either for money or some other form
of compensation,

and the "jus pUblicum"

(public property),

which was held in trust for the pUblic. 6 7 The areas which
were most important to the public rights were both the coasts,
and those stretches of rivers which were affected by the ebb
and flow of the tides.
By the time that Sir Matthew Hale produced his landmark

64 Wilkinson, "Headwaters of the Public Trust",
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College,
Spring, 1989: 165 Id.
66 I d ., at 2.
67 Id.
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legal work,

De Jure Maris

(1670),68

the legal presumption

was that riparian land owners had the exclusive right to use
the beds and banks along their adjoining fresh-water rivers.
This presumption, however, was sUbject to a pUblic right to
use the beds and banks for purposes incidental to navigation,
where the pUblic had acquired that right by prescription or
custom. 6 9 The beds and banks of navigable rivers were

in

fact used by the pub Li.c , as a matter of right, for "anchoring,
mooring, and towing vessels along the banks, where the pUblic
had need for such uses." 7 0 Subsequently, where there was a
conflict with the pUblic right of navigation, the right of
navigation prevailed. 7 1 Thus, the act of anchoring a vessel
was

upheld

as

an

inalienable

public

right

through

the

doctrines of English Common law.
English Common law later went on to become the law of the
thirteen colonies, and eventually, upon ratification of the
Constitution,

the

law

of

the

thirteen

original

states. 72

Before the Revolutionary War, by grants from the Crown, the
thirteen colonies held title to lands within their borders.
68 Sir Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, 1 Hargrave Tracts,
5-44, London, 1787.
69 Wilkinson, "Headwaters of the Public Trust",
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College,
Spring, 1989: 3.
70 Id., at 49.

71 I d .
72 Amaral and Lee, Public Rights to Coastal Waters,
Rhode Island, Coastal Resources Center, 1990: xviii.
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They also had title to areas of coastline and subme+ged lands.
SUbsequent to the formation of the new United states,
the colonies

(now states)

adopted the Constitution,

hence

forming a single union bound together by a common legislative
body. The states, however, withheld both their tidelands and
navigable waters from the United States, thereby not ceding
these lands to the new Federal government. 7 3 As a result,
authority

held

by

the

states

over

these

tidelands

and

navigable waters (trust lands) is plenary, SUbject only to the
powers surrendered to the Federal government upon ratification
of the Constitution. The Constitution subsequently provides
that it, all Federal laws and international treaties "shall be
the supreme law of the land".74 Hence, although a state may
have title to,
navigable

and extend authority over a certain area of

water

and

its

underlying

lands,

Federal

or

constitutional provisions and doctrines affecting the same
area are superior to those of the state. Thus,

state laws

which are in conflict with federal policy are preempted by
federal authority.

2) Expansion of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine
Both the existence of the public trust doctrine as a
facet of constitutional law, and its significance in enabling
73 Id.
74 Id.
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the federal government to use its powers of preemption over
state legislative acts, were affirmed in the important case of
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois (1892) .75
In 1869 the state of Illinois granted more than 1000
acres of state land to the Illinois Central Railroad Co .. The
area granted comprised a

substantial portion of chicago's

waterfront on Lake Michigan, a navigable lake. The grant also
included sUbmerged lands in chicago's harbor. The area was
described as being:
... as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks
along the Thames at London; is much larger than that
included in the famous docks and basins at Liverpool; is
twice that of the port of Marseilles, and nearly if not
equal to the1%ier area along the water front of the city
of New York.
Four

years

company,

after

said

the state,

lands

were

given

to

amid cries of corruption,

the

railroad

revoked the

grant. 7 7
75 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892). The Illinois Central case is considered to be

the cornerstone of legal matters dealing with the pUblic
trust doctrine.
76 I d . at 454.
77 Although the state maintained that certain
limitations had been placed on the railroad company's
control of the harbor beds, the railroad company treated the
conveyance as an "absolute conveyance to it of title to the
submerged lands, giving it, as full and complete power to
use and dispose of the same, except in the technical
transfer of the fee, in any manner it may choose, as if they
were uplands, in no respect covered or affected by navigable
waters." Id. at 450. See also wilkinson, "The Headwaters of
the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine", Spring,
1989: 83.
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The Supreme Court recognized that Illinois received title
to the harbor upon entering the Union,
constitution.

This title,

publ ic trust

in order to keep the waterways

pUblic,

for

uses

such

however,

and ratifying the

as

implicitly carne with a

navigation,

open to the

commerce,

and

fishing 7 8. Thus, any grant which might deprive the public of
these rights would necessarily be revokable. The court went on
to state that:

••• A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of
a state has never been adjudged to be within the
legislative power, and any attempted grant of the kind
would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as
SUbject to revocation ..• It is the settled law of this
country that the ownership and dominion and sovereignty
over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of
the several states, belong to the respective states
within which they are found, with the consequent right to
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be
done without substantial impairment of the interest of
the public in the waters, and SUbject always to the
paramount right of Congress to control their navigation
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations and among the states. 7 9

The major result of Illinois Central is that the court
both recognized pUblic trust rights in the affected, submerged
lands,

and used constitutional powers to ensure that the

public would be able to enjoy those rights. The case also
helped to define the scope of the public trust doctrine, and
78 Id. Navigation, commerce and fishing have been
traditional pUblic trust rights throughout the history of
the modern American public trust doctrine.
79 Illinois Central Railroad Co v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892), at 453 & 435.
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cast it into the existing body of federal case law. Subsequent
Supreme

Court

granted

a

decisions

have

recognized

wide degree of discretion

that

states

are

in administering the

trust. None of the ensuing opinions, however, have disturbed
Illinois Central's premise that the pub Li,c trust doctrine
applies to all navigable watercourses as a matter of federal
law. 8 0
At the time during which Illinois Central was decided,
the rights of the pUblic in pUblic trust areas were those of
fishing,

commerce

and

navigation.

Recently,

however,

the

coverage of the public trust has been expanded to include
recreation

as

an

additional

Whitney,81

the

court

found

public
that

right.

"trust

In

purposes

broader than traditional uses of navigation,

Marks

v.

are

far

commerce and

fishing,

and include uses such as open space and wildlife

habitat,

use for scientific purposes,

swimming.,,82 Likewise,

hunting, bathing and

in Orion Corp. v. washington,83 the

80 Wilkinson, "The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some
of the Traditional Doctrine", Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis and Clark College, spring, 1989: 14. The standards
which were set out in Illinois Central were reaffirmed in
cases such as shively v. Bowlby, 152, U.S. 1 (1894), where
the court stated that "[lands under tidewaters] are of great
value to the pUblic for the purposes of commerce,
navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals,
when permitted is incidental or subordinate to the pUblic
use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole
people."
81 Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251 (1971).
82 Id. at 259-60.
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court stated that public trust rights include "navigation,
fishing,

water

swimming,

recreational purposes.,,84 Finally,
Elkhart

Lake,aS

the

and

skiing,

public

other

related

in Menzer v. Village of

trust

doctrine

was

expanded

exponentially to include "all pUblic uses of water.,,86
The pUblic trust doctrine has also been used as a means
by Which regUlations which place restrictions on the ability
of

the

pUblic

invalidated.

to
In

enjoy

public

trust

v.

Matthews

rights

Bay

Head

have

been

Improvement

Association,87 the court addressed the question of whether
a quasi-public association could exclude,
fees

to

non-association

members

for

or charge higher

beach

access.

The

association owns a street-wide strip of land Which spans the
length of the beach, is located at the foot of seven pUblic
streets, and extends down to the mean high water mark. Except
for a short period during low tides, beach access necessitates
passing

over

land

controlled

association maintained the beach,

by

the

association.

The

and employed life guards

along its span during the summer months. Use of the beach was

83 Orion Corp v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d. 621 (1987),
Cert. denied; 108 s. ct. 1996 (1988).
84 Id. at 640-41.
85 Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d
(1971).
86 Id. at 70.
87 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 95
N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984).
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restricted to members during certain hours of the day,

and

members who were not residents of Bay Head were charged higher
membership fees than residents. Another significant factor in
the case is that there are no public beaches in the Borough of
Bay Head.
In

examining

the

case,

the

court

held

that

if

the

residents of every municipality bordering the New Jersey shore
were

to

adopt

the

Bay Head

pol icy,

the

pub I ic would

be

prevented from exercising its right to enjoy the foreshore.
Thus,

the Bay Head Policy was found to be contrary to the

purpose

of

permissible.

the

public

Likewise,

trust

doctrine,

and

hence

not

the court held that the association

could not charge fees which would distinguish

in any way

between residents and non-residents. 8 8
In a similar New Jersey case, Neptune city v. Borough of
Avon by the sea,89 the New Jersey Supreme court prohibited
municipalities from charging higher fees to non-residents than
to

residents

for

the

use

of

city

beaches.

Although

the

plaintiffs did not argue their case as one involving the
pUblic trust doctrine, the court supplied the view that the
"public trust doctrine dictates that a beach and ocean waters
must be open to all on equal terms and without preferance and

88 Id.
89 Neotune city v. Borough of Avon by the Sea, 61 N.J.
296 (1972).
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that

any

contrary

state

or

municipal

action

is

impermissible. ,,90
As it can be seen,

the publ ic trust doctr ine is both

powerful and broad-reaching. Navigation and recreation, which
are both closely associated with sailing, cruising, and other
manifestations of water-bourne activities have been repeatedly
upheld as pUblic rights. In the United states, these rights
are

inalienable,

speech,

in the

same

respect

as

are

freedoms

of

religion and education. To restrict navigation and

recreation by the imposition of fees, or the requirement of
permits which may potentially be denied, is akin to placing
similar

restrictions

Likewise,

if

on

anchoring

speech,
is

an

relegion
activity

and

education.

associated

with

navigation, recreation, or directly linked to the pUblic trust
doctrine,

laws

which

impose

unnecessary

restrictions

on

anchoring may be contrary to public trust interests and hence
unconstitutional.

3) The Public Trust in Hawaii

In assessing the constitutionality of anchoring
which

have

been

enacted

in

the

State

of

Hawaii,

laws

it

is

important to take into consideration Hawaii's unique status of
being a state which joined the Union only a relatively short
while ago. Although currently a state liable to all federal
90 Id. at 47.
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laws and constitutional provisions, Hawaii still retains some
vestiges

of

legal

concepts

enacted

under

its

previous

monarchy. One example of this is the historical recognition of
private rights of ownership over fishponds.

Although many

Hawaiian fishponds are located in the coastal zone and fit the
definition provided by the federal government of "navigable
waters",

they

concept

of

are

recognized

ownership

is

as

akin

private

to

that

property. 91
of

a

farmer

This
over

farmland, as both are used as a means of providing food both
for the owner and for sale to other members of the community.
In this respect, the recognition of private rights over what
would normally be considered pUblic resources is in accordance
with the pUblic interest.
Through
expanded,
trust.

its unique historical

background,

Hawaii has

in some respects, the uses involved in the pUblic

The

following

legal

cases

are

provided

with

the

intention of clarifying those expansions under Hawaiian law.
The first case which acknowledged the application of
pUblic trust rights in Hawaii was that of King v. Oahu Railway
&

Land Co .. 92 The case was similar to Illinois Central in

that

it

involved a

railway company

attempting to condemn

submerged lands and alienate them from the pUblic for railroad
purposes. The Hawaiian territorial court, however, declared

91 Kaiser-Aetna v. United states, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
92 King v. Oahu Railway and Land Co., 11 Haw. 717
(1899).
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that the lands under the navigable waters in and around the
territory of Hawaii were held in trust for public uses. The
court

went

on

to

recognize

that

publ d c

these

trust

uses

included "navigation, sailing and anchorage of vessels. "93
The

unique

legal

status

of

Hawaiian

fishponds

is

illustrated in Kaiser-Aetna v. United states. 9 4 The issue in
this

case

took

into

consideration

the

legal

status

of

a

private Hawaiian fishpond which was transformed into a marina
servicing an exclusive commercial and residential development.
Before the development of the Hawaii-Kai Marina, Kuapa Pond
was a

shallow lagoon,

separated from Maunalua Bay and the

Pacific Ocean by a barrier beach. 9 5 It was subject to the
ebb and flow of Pacific tides, and was navigated by shallowdraft

f i ah Lnq

vessels

for

private

fishing

purposes.

Upon

creating the marina, the owners dredged the lagoon, and made
openings in the barrier beach to allow the passage of larger
vessels. 9 6

Upon

opening

the

lagoon

to

accommodate

the

passage of vessels other than the original fishing vessels,
the United states, through the Army Corps of Engineers made
the contentions that (A) since the lagoon now fit the federal
definition of a navigable waterway, the marina was SUbject to

93 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept. of
the Interior, 1978: 327.
94 Kaiser-Aetna v. United states, 444 US 164 (1979).
95 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 152.
96 Id. at 153, 154.
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Army Corps regulation under Section 10 of the Rivers
Harbors Act,97 and,(B)

as a navigable waterway,

and

the public

was free to navigate the waters of the lagoon without being
sUbject to fees. 9 B The court recognized the unique status of
Hawaiian

fishponds,

and

in

deciding

the

case,

held

that

although Army Corps jurisdiction could be extended over the
lagoon, the owners still retained a private interest in the
development, and could therefore continue to charge boating
and mooring fees. 9 9
Even with Hawaii's recognition of the special status of
fishponds, it should also be noted that in some cases, where
a tenant's exclusive rights over a fishery have been upheld,
the courts have limited that right strictly to the fishery,
and not to the geographical area in which the fishing is being
conducted. One such example of this concept is illustrated in
Kuramo v. Hamada. 1 0 0
In this case, the tenant of an exclusive fishery sought
to prevent interference with his exclusive fishing rights from
a boatman who would anchor his vessel in the tidal waters and
sell bait to others. The court held that although the tenant
had established exclusive fishing rights, these rights were

97 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, u.S. Dept of
The Interior, 1978: 329.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Kuramo v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841 (1929).
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limited to the fishery. There was no evidence that the tenant
had established private rights to the lands underlying the
tidal waters, hence it was presumed that the Territory owned
the

land

in

thereto. l Ol

question

and

all

the

rights

incidental

The court then went on to establish that when

rights of fishery and navigation come into conflict, the right
of navigation is paramount. l 0 2 This conclusion echoes the
vestiges of English Common law. Finally, the court held that
the right of navigation included the right of anchorage, and
denied the requested injunction. 1 0 3
As it can be seen, Hawaii is somewhat unique in that it
recognizes, in certain instances, a private interest in what
might elsewhere be held to be pUblic domain. This is important
with regard to anchorage laws, in that in some very specific
circumstances, the collection of fees from anchored and moored
vessels may be a permissible activity.

Evidence indicates,

that this may only be done by private parties,

within the

limits of what has been legally recognized to be their private
lands. Evidence, however, does not justify the imposition of
restrictions or fees on anchored vessels in state-owned lands
(lands SUbject to the public trust). On the contrary, Hawaiian
case

law

has

shown

navigation,

and

more

specifically

101 Id.
102 I d .
103 Id. See also Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon,
u.S. Dept of THe Interior, 1978, at 328.
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anchoring, to be activities consistent with the public's use
of state-owned lands (public trust rights).
The conclusion to be drawn from this data is that laws
which

may

potentially

serve

to

deny,

restrict,

or

place

incidental burdens upon navigation or anchoring are contrary
to pUblic trust interests. Therefore, through the application
of the pUblic trust doctrine, such laws may be found to be
unconstitutional.
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B. The Federal Navigation Servitude

During
Britain,

the

the

years

early

which

followed

settlers

independence

established

paths

from

of

both

exploration and trade along the watercourses of the newly
formed nation. These watercourses functioned as transportation
routes,

and

their

settlement. 104

shores

Recognition

became
of

the
the

unimpeded system of transportation
seen as

logical

areas

importance

of

(and navigation)

far back as the era of George Washington.

for
an

can be
While

traveling through the nation's interior, washington said:

... 1 could not help taking a more extensive view of the
vast inland navigation of these United states and could
not but be struck by the immense extent and importance of
it, and of the goodness of that providence which has
dealt its favors to us with so profuse a hand. Would to
God we may have the wisdom to improve them. 105
Washington's
Northwest

sentiment

Ordinance

of

was

echoed

1787. 1 06

in
The

Article

IV

Ordinance

of

provides

that:

104 S. Dunbar, A History of Travel in America, New
York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1915: 16-17.
105 Wilkinson, "The Headwaters of the Public Trust:
Some of the Traditional Doctrine", Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis and Clark College, Spring, 1989: 55, quoting
George Washington.
106 Northwest Ordinance, Ch. 8, 1., Stat. 50, 52
(1789) .
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the

The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and st.
Lawrence and the carrying places between the same, shall
be common highways, and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of
the United states, and those of any other states that may
be admitted into the Confederacy, without any tax,
import, or duty therefor. 1 0 7
Thus,

congressional recognition of the

navigation was codified into law,

importance of free

thereby reinforcing the

concept of navigation as a pUblic right.
The federal navigation servitude is the paramount right
of the federal government, under the commerce clause of the
Uni ted

states

Constitution to

compel

the

removal

of

any

obstructions to navigation without necessarily having to pay
"just compensation" which is ordinarily required by the Fifth
Amendment. 1 0 a Although similar in spirit,
doctrine

and

the

navigation

distinct doctrines.

servitude

the pUblic trust
are

separate

and

The public trust doctrine is developed

from the common law, and generally applies to the states. The
federal navigation servitude,

however,

accomplishes at the

federal level some of the same things which the pUblic trust
doctrine accomplishes at the state level. One of the oldest
uses of the public trust doctrine

is the preservation of

navigation. The federal navigation servitude is designed to
preserve navigation,

hence the two distinct doctrines can

107 Id. at 52.
loa Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 147.
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accomplish the same purpose on two different levels. 1 0 9
The navigation servitude is derived from the commerce
clause, which is the third clause of Article 1, section 8 of
the

united

states

constitution. 1 1 0

This

section

provides

that:

The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes ... and to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the government of the united states or in
any department or offices thereof. 1 1 1

For many years after the enactment of the Constitution,
Congress

did

little

or

nothing

to

establish

a

federal

navigation servitude. 1 1 2 This was to change in 1824, in the
Supreme Court case of Gibbons v.
well

be

servitude.

considered
The

steamboat owner,

the

Ogden « 113 which may very

cornerstone

of

the

case arose when the defendant,

navigation
Gibbons,

a

challenged the constitutionality of a New

109 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.S. Dept of
The Interior, 1978: 140. At the state level, the public
trust doctrine and the navigation servitude are often
discussed together. This is understandable in view of the
similar results which they can accomplish.
110 The Constitution of the united states, Article 1,
Section 8, Sept. 17, 1787.
111 Id.
112 sweat, "Water Related Property", practicing Law
Inst, 1990: 8.
113 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
43

(9 Wheat.) 23

(1824).

York statute, which gave Robert Fulton the exclusive right of
navigation of the waters of the state by steamboat. The United
states Supreme court held that the New York legislation was
repugnant to the constitution and especially to the commerce
clause,

and therefore void. 11 4 In deciding the case, Chief

Justice Marshall defined the meaning of commerce within the
commerce clause as comprehending navigation:

The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our
constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of
enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the
extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the
meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would
limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it
comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general
term, applicable to many objects, to one of its
significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it
is something more; it is intercourse. It describes the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The
mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating
commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws
concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the
admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports
of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for
the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of
buying and selling, or of barter ... The power of Congress,
then, comprehends navigation within the limits of every
state in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in
any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign
nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian
tribes,.115
Like

the

navigation

pUblic

servitude

trust
has

doctrine,

expanded

114 I d .
115 Id. at 188, 190.
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over

the

scope

time.

One

of

the

of

the

earliest cases to both incorporate the navigation servitude,
and expand its scope to include submerged lands was that of
Gibson v. United states. 1 1 6 The case was brought to recover
damages

resulting from the construction of a

United states Government.

dike by the

In assessing the case,

the court

stated that:

All navigable waters are under the control of the United
states for the purpose of regulating and improving
navigation, and although the title to the shore and
submerged soil is in the various states and individual
owners under it, it is always subject to the [navigation]
servitude in respect of navigation created in favor of
the federal government by the Constitution. 1 1 7

In recent years, the scope of the navigation servitude
has gone beyond its original spirit of dealing strictly with
trade-related

commerce.

It

has

been

expanded

to

include

recreational boats of all sizes. 1 1 8 One authority describes
this expansion in the following terms:

All state-created rights in navigable waters are subject
to the exercise of paramount constitutional powers by the
United states in areas of national concern which require
uniform regulation. Perhaps the most extensive of these
powers is the power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce ... Here, the concern is with the extent and scope
116 Gibson v. United states, 166 U.S. 1000 (1897).
117 Id. at 271, 272.
118 Dennis Nixon, "Evolution of Public and Private
Rights to Rhode Island's Shore", Suffolk Univ. Law Rev.,
Summer 1990: 3.
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of the limitations, under the commerce clause, that are
placed on public and private rights established under
state law. Of course, any state law or property rule,
inconsistent with the federal exercise of power described
here, cannot withstand a challenge which raises the
federal question. On the other hand, the publ Lc is
relatively free to exercise recreational uses of
navigable waters under federal control when these uses
are consistent with the paramount federal program or
national interest. 1 19
Although the navigation servitude does not specifically
grant that the federal government has the power to supercede
state authority with regard to the establishment of laws which
regulate anchoring,
definition

of

such power may be distilled

navigation,

and

more

from

specifically,

the
the

association of anchoring with such a definition. If anchoring
is

an

attribute

of

navigation,

then

laws which

regulate

anchoring may be subject to federal preemption through the
navigation servitude, established in both the Constitution and
the SUbmerged Lands Act.

This association,

of course,

dependant upon the definition of navigation.

119 Leighty, "The Source and Scope of Public and
Private Rights in Navigable Waters", Land and Water Law
Rev., 1978: 391, 425, 426.
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is

c.

The state Police Power

The state police power, like the public trust doctrine,
operates in favor of the protection of pUblic rights.

The

attribute

of

police

sovereignty.120

hence

is

power

A

state's

an

inherent

extension

of

police

power

has

been recognized as providing the justification behind which
some laws which may affect navigation have been enacted. 12 1
The united states Supreme Court, in an 1847 case upholding the
constitutionality

of

licensing

statutes,

defined

police

power: 122

[The police powers of a state] ... are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether
a state passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish
offenders, or to establish courts of justice, or
requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to
regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it
exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of
sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within
the limits of its domain. It is by virtue of this power
that it legislates; and its authority to make regulations
of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health
laws, except in so far as it has been restricted by the
120 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, u.S. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 81.
121 Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991).
122 Id. at 82. See also License Cases, 46 U.S. 504
(1847). These consolidated cases involved various state
statutes which regUlated, licensed or prohibited the sale of
alcoholic beverages. It was claimed that these statutes were
unconstitutional or in violation of the federal power to
regulate interstate commerce.
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states.

united

the

of

constitution
added).I23

(Emphasis

The police power is derived from the Tenth Amendment to
the united states Constitution, which reads: "The powers not
delegated

to

the

United

states

by

the

Constitution,

nor

prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively,

or

to

the

people. "124

Accordingly,

the

leading police power cases in the United states Supreme Court
involve appeals from state supreme court decisions, in which
state

legislation

unconstitutional. 1 25

was

Although

attacked
police

power

as
cases

being
usually

involve state police powers, the Supreme Court has also both
referred to and reaffirmed an analogous implied federal power
over federal

property.126 Likewise,

it has been held that

federal exertion of the power to regulate commerce under the
123 License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847) at 53.
124 The Constitution of The United States, Amendment X,
1791.
125 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 82. Usually, the United states
constitutional provisions involved are fifth and fourteenth
amendments, prohibiting the taking of private property
without just compensation. The issue is also of importance
in anchoring laws because of the very nature of claims of
unconstitutionality thereof.
126 Id. at 83. See also Camfield v. United states, 167
U.S. 122 (1887) at 525.: " .•. and even over public land
within the states, the general government doubtless has a
power over its own property analogous to the police power of
the several states, and the extent to which it may go in the
exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the
particular case."
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commerce clause is attended by the same incidents which attend
the

exercise

Generally,

of

the

police

powers

of

the

state. 1 27

police powers are employed when such regulation

becomes necessary to preserve the public good.
Like the public trust doctrine, the roots of state and
federal police powers may be found in English Common law.
several examples of valid regulation for the common good can
be seen in the following excerpt from sir Matthew Hale's De
portibus Maris:

A man for his own private advantage, may, in a port or
town, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he
and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage,
housellage, pesage, for he doth no more than is lawful
for any man to do, viz.: makes the most of his own. If
the King or SUbject have a public wharf, unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or
lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the
wharfs only licensed by the Queen, or because there is no
other wharf in that port as it may fallout where a port
is neWly erected: in that case there cannot be taken
arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage,
pesage, etc. neither can they be enhanced to an
immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and
moderate, though settled by the King's license or
charter.
For now the wharf and crane and other
conveniences are effected with a pub Li.o interest and they
cease to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a
street in a new building on his own land, it is now no
longer bare .nr-Lvat;e interest, but is affected by a pub Li,c
interest. 128"
Despite having similar bases in common law principles,
there is a significant difference between the police power and

127 I d .
128 Id. at 85, quoting sir Matthew Hale.
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the

public

trust

doctrine.

doctrine prescribes a

In

essence,

series of pub Li,c

the

pUblic

rights,

trust

while the

police power may be used as a means of ensuring those rights.
with regard to the ownership of submerged lands, public trust
property is sUbject to an ownership interest retained by the
state on behalf of the pUblic and is applicable only to those
pUblic areas. The police power, however, reaches all property,
private and public, but as to private property,
interest

is

not

an

ownership

interest,

regulate is accordingly limited. 1 2 9

129 Id at 86.
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and

the

the public
power to

CHAPTER III: STATUTORY ISSUES AFFECTING THE ANCHORING
CONFLICT

A. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953

History of the Submerged Lands Act

1)

Up until the middle half of the twentieth century, there
was little if any question as to who held title to a state's
sUbmerged

lands.

The

original

thirteen

states

viewed

themselves as having both jurisdiction over and ownership of
the resources of this area. Likewise, the states recognized
that such jurisdiction and ownership was sUbject only to the
overriding constitutional powers of the federal government to
regulate

matters

of

navigation,

commerce

affairs. 1 30 Under the equal footing doctrine,
were

subsequently

assump~ions,

their

admitted

to

the

Union

and

foreign

states which

adopted

similar

and enjoyed the right to extend authority over

sUbmerged

lands,

again

being

only

sUbject

to

constitutional provisions.
Although not the first time the issue was examined,131
the

idea

of

state

ownership

of

submerged

lands

was

130 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 407.
131 Martin v. Waddell similarly examined the question
in 1842.
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sUbstantially affirmed through the 1845 Supreme Court decision
in Pollard v. Hagan. 1 3 2. The case concerned a dispute over
the ownership of a lot on Mobile Bay, in Mobile, Alabama. The
sole question was whether Congress had the power to grant to
private ownership lands which had been below navigable waters
at the time that Alabama had been admitted into the Union, but
had become fast land by the receding of the high water mark in
sUbsequent years 1 3 3. The court found that whether the water
had

receded

Congress

by

did

natural

not

have

causes
the

or

by

authority

human
to

intervention,

grant

title,

as

ownership was in the state. The court stated that:
Then to Alabama belong the navigable waters, and soils
under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the
rights surrendered by the Constitution of the United
States; and no compact between her and the united States
could diminish or enlarge these rights. 1 3 4
The

idea

of

state

ownership

and

jurisdiction

over

submerged lands was held to be almost sacrosanct for over one
hundred years, until a chain of events beginning in the early
twentieth century shattered that trend.

The

issue did not

become important until oil and gas were discovered offshore in

132 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212,

(1845).

133 Id.
134 Id. at 573. The court also considered the power of
the United States to convey pUblic lands and held that the
power of Congress over the public lands (or public domain)
conferred no power to grant the shores of navigable waters
and the soils under them which were not granted by the
Constitution to the United states, but were reserved to the
States respectively.
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both the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. 1 35 As early
as 1921, the California legislature began to enact legislation
authorizing leases within three English (land) miles of the
California

coast. 1 3 6 This practice was

initially accepted

by the federal government until 1945. 1 37
In 1945, the federal government sought a decree declaring
federal

ownership

of

lands

off

the

shore

of

California,

underlying the Pacific Ocean, out to the extent of the "threemile belt".138 The federal government brought suit against
the state of California, alleging that the United states was
the owner of the lands in question. 1 3 9 California contended
that the three-mile belt was a part of the land underlying the
navigable

waters

which passed

to

the

state

on

attaining

statehood.

135 Ray Sweat, "water Related Property, Creditors'
Rights and Forfeiture of Title", Practicing Law Inst., Dec.,
1990: 31.
136 Id. The inland waters, bays, gulfs and estuaries,
and water extending seaward three nautical miles (3.45
English, or land miles), from the low water mark are known
as the territorial waters within the jurisdiction and
sovereignty of the coastal state or country. The three
nautical miles, or one marine league, was thought to be the
extent of the effective range of land-based weapons near the
end of the eighteenth century. Areas beyond this distance
were thought to be the high seas, common to all nations. Id.
at 5.
137 Kalo: Coastal and Ocean Law,: 407.
138 Helen Althaus, PUblic Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s.
Dept. of The Interior, 1978: 201.
139 Sweat, "Water Related Property", Practicing Law
Inst., 1990: 30.
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In evaluating the case, the Supreme Court held that the
three-mile belt was owned by the united States, and not solely
by California. The court pointed out that historically the
three-mile

belt

was

a

concept

which

came

after

the

revolutionary war, and that it was the federal government that
sUbsequently

gained

dominion

over

it. 1 4 0

The

precedent

which was thought to have been established since Pollard v.
Hagan

was

nation's

dismissed

when

international

the

court

emphasized

responsibilities

may

that
have

the
been

involved:

What this government does, or even what the states do,
anywhere in the ocean, is a subject upon which the nation
may enter into and assume treaty or similar international
obligations ... the very oil about which the state and
nation here contend might well become the sUbject of
international dispute and settlement ... The ocean, even
its three-mile belt, is thus of valid consequence to the
nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in
peace with the world ... Conceding that the state has been
authorized to exercise local police power functions in
the part of the marginal belt within its declared
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal
Government's paramount rights in and power over this
area. 1 4 1
Accordingly, the court ruled that federal rights are paramount
in the three-mile belt.
Following the California decision, the Attorney General
of the United states immediately filed similar cases against
140 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept of
The Interior, 1978: 202.
141 United states v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), at
35, 36, 91.
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Louisiana and Texas, the two other big oil producing states.
By 1950, the Supreme Court had announced similar decisions in
favor of the United States. 1 4 2
The

decisions

in these

cases

caused quite

a

bit

of

controversy, which was soon felt by Congress. Likewise, their
outcome brought drilling for oil and gas almost to a complete
standstill. The first congressional action in response to the
deleterious situation was to create Senate Joint Resolution
Twenty, which would have quitclaimed all federal interests in
the

submerged

lands

to

the

coastal

states,

and

restored

ownership of the submerged lands within the three-mile limit
to the respective states 14 3.

Congress sent the resolution

to then President Truman in 1952, but the President, being a
firm proponent of federal ownership of offshore resources,
vetoed the bill. 1 4 4 Subsequently, numerous bills which were
similar in character were also introduced by Congress, but
alas

were

consistently

opposed

as

"giveaway

legislation" .145 The controversy came to be known as the
"tidelands issue",

and was a major factor during the 1952

142 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, u.S. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 204. See also United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v. Texas,
339 U.S. 707 (1950).
143 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 412.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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Presidential elections. 1 4 6
Truman's
submerged

efforts

lands

were

to

preserve
quickly

federal

reversed

Eisenhower's election to the Presidency.
Eisenhower signed the Submerged Lands Act
this statute,

ownership
upon

of

General

On May 22,

1953,

into law. 147 By

the United states relinquished and assigned

title and ownership of the disputed submerged lands to the
respective coastal states. 148

146 Ernest Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy,
Austin, University of Texas Press, 1953: 3-5.
147 I d .
148 Althaus, Public Trust Rights, Oregon, U.s. Dept. of
The Interior, 1978: 204.
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2) Selected Provisions of the Submerged Lands Act
The Submerged Lands Act established the ownership by the
states of the lands periodically or permanently covered by
tidal waters up to, but not beyond, the mean high tide line,
extending seaward to
miles

from

the

mean

an arbitrary line three geographical
low

tide

line. 1 4 9

The

Act

further

provided that, as to the states bordering the Gulf of Mexico,
ownership would extend seaward up to three marine leagues from
the coastline, if their original boundaries had extended that
distance. 150
The Act also served as a means of conferring the "natural
resources"

within

the

three-mile

band

to

the

respective

coastal state. A very specific definition of the constitution
of "natural resources" was provided in the Act:

The term 'natural resources' includes, without limiting
the generality thereof, oil, gas and other minerals, and
fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges,
kelp, and other marine animal and plant life but does not
include water power, or the use of water for the

149 Sweat, "Water Related Property", Practicing Law
Inst., 1990: 33.
150 Id. In United States v. Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, and Texas, 364 U.S. 502 (1960) and United
states v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 285 (1965), the United States
Supreme Court confirmed title in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi three geographical miles seaward from their
coastlines and in Florida and Texas, three leagues seaward
from their respective coasts. This fixed the title to all
the lands, minerals and other natural resources underlying
the Gulf of Mexico to the lines previously described.
57

production of power. 1 5 1
By virtue of the Submerged Lands Act and the sUbsequent
sovereignty imparted on the states over the resources lying
within the three mile territorial sea, states are allowed to
enact laws which affect these resources. Hence, as an anchor
dropped overboard from a vessel navigating in a state's waters
comes to rest on the sUbmerged land under the vessel,

the

anchor lies on state-owned land. If done in a careless manner,
such an anchor could be very hazardous to a coral resource. In
this respect,

the Act may be interpreted as providing the

justification by which states have enacted laws to regulate
anchoring. The question of anchoring as an act of navigation,
however, becomes a point of interest at this juncture, as its
regulation may be preempted by the federal government through
the implications of section 1314, (a), of the Act:

The United states retains all its navigational servitude
and rights in and power of regulation and control of said
lands and navigable waters for the constitutional
purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs, all of which shall be paramount
to, but shall not be deemed to include proprietary rights
of ownership or the rights of management, administration,
leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural
resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed,
established and vested in and assigned to the res~ective
states and others by section 1311 of this title. 52

151 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C., Section
1301 (e).
152 Id. Section 1314 (a).
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Thus,

although a

state may be

justified in regulating or

collecting revenues from the use of its submerged lands, the
applicability of state laws which purport to do so is limited
by the powers retained by the federal government through the
navigation servitude.
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B. Federal Regulatory Authority: Coast Guard versus Army Corps

One of the questions which has been raised with regard to
the anchoring conflict is exactly which federal agency has
been entrusted with the duty to oversee matters of navigation,
and more specificly matters of anchoring? The choice lies
between the Coast Guard (the regulatory arm of the Department
of Transportation),

and the Army

Corps of Engineers

(the

regulatory arm of the Department of Defense). While the Army
Corps

of

Engineers

(Army

Corps)

does

oversee

matters

concerning the maintenance of unobstructed navigation,

the

Coast Guard is likewise employed in similar duties. In light
of

the

matters

discussed

in

this

project,

it

is

more

appropriate to consider the Coast Guard as the primary federal
regulatory authority. It is likewise important to consider the
extent of authority held by the Army Corps.

1) The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
The authority of the Army Corps as the

federal

body

responsible for ensuring free navigation began with the Rivers
and

Harbors

Act

of

1899. 1 5 3

The

Act

gave

the

Corps

regulatory control over the navigable waters of the United
states,

and the power to enforce the laws of the federal

153 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 401
et. seq.
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•
government

in

such

waters.

The

Army

Corps'

regulatory

authority over navigation and commerce was derived indirectly
from

the

United

Army

Corps'

Constitution. 1 54

States

regulatory

activities

In

primarily

general,
consisted

the
of

reviewing proposed projects, and issuing and enforcing permits
for activities undertaken in navigable waters of the United
states. 1 5 5
prevent

That

these

obstructions

responsibilities
to

navigation

is

were

intended

evident

in

to
the

provisions of the Act:

The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively
authorized by Congress to the navigable capacity of any
of the waters of the United states is prohibitedi ... it
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of
any Wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater,
bulkhead,
jetty,
or
other
structures
in
any
port ... harbor ... or other water of the United States,
except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers,
and authorized by the Secretary of the Army .... I56

It should be noted that the 'obstructions to navigation'
indicated in the provisions of the Act primarily refer to
physical

obstructions

to

navigation.

Wharfs,

piers,

and

154 The power to regUlate matters of commerce and
navigation is derived from Congressional power under the
United states Constitution, Art.1, Sec.8, "the commerce
clause". Although control over navigable waters is not
specificly granted to the government in the Constitution,
the Supreme Court held in Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824),
that the power to regUlate commerce includes the power to
regUlate navigation, hence navigable waters.
155 Kalo, Coastal and Ocean Law, 1990: 171.
156 33 U.S.C. Sec. 403. Obstruction of navigable
waters.
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breakwaters are all items which may pose a physical hazard to
navigation,

thus

affecting

the

particular body of water.
existence

of

any

navigable

capacity of any

Research has not

'anchorage

laws'

which

indicated the
may

have

been

considered to pose an obstruction to navigation at the time
when the Act was passed. Likewise, the legislative history of
the Rivers and Harbors Act does not indicate that it was to be
used

to

regulate

the

anchoring

of

vessels.

Army

Corps

jurisdiction over acts of navigation, such as anchoring, may
have been implied in the early part of this century simply
because of the fact that no other federal regulatory body with
powers over navigable waters existed at that time.
The United states Coast Guard did not come into existence
until

the

early

established

through

Act. 1 57

This

states

revenue

consolidated

part

Act

1915,

the

served

cutter,

group,

Transportation.

of

it

Department
to

and

combine

the

over

was

the

by

Lighthouse

officially

Transportation

of

life-saving

presided

Later,

when

existing

services
the

United

into one

Department

Service

of

of
the

Department of Commerce was to be incorporated into this group
as well. 1 58
The Department of Transportation Act served to transfer
all functions, powers and duties of the Secretary of the Army
157 Department of Transportation Act, 80 Stat. 931.,
January, 1915.
158 Presidential Reorganization Plan No.2, July 1,
1939.
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Transportation. 159
navigation

and

to

laws,

specified

under

These

laws

anchorage

secretary

the

specifically

areas. 160

The

of

applied

to

Secretary

of

Transportation, in turn, delegated to the Commandant of the
Coast Guard the authority to

exercise the powers

of the

Secretary with respect to anchorages and navigation. 1 61
section
1915,162

7

of the

empowers

the

River

and

Harbor Act

Coast Guard with

establish anchorage grounds

for vessels

of March

4,

the authority

to

in

the navigable

waters of the united States "whenever it is apparent that
[anchorage grounds] are required by the maritime or commercial
interests of the United States for safe navigation.,,163 The
provisions of the Act go on to establish that:
District Commanders will, whenever matters relating to
the anchorage of vessels are under consideration,
ascertain the view of the District and Division Engineer,
Corps
of Engineers,
U. S.
Army,
and
the
proper
representatives of other departments likely to be
. t eres t e d .... 164
ln

159 Id. at 6(g).
160 Coast Guard Regulations, 33 C.F.R., Sec. 109.01
(1989) .
161 Department of Transportation Order 1100.1 See also
49 C.F.R. 1.4 (a) (3).
162 River and Harbor Act of March 4, 1915, 33 U.S.C.
471.
163 Coast Guard Regulations, 33 C.F.R. Sec. 109.05.
164 Id. at 109.05 (b).
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This

provision

is

important

in

that

it

places

the

authority of the Coast Guard and Army Corps into perspective.
While it is primarily the duty of the Coast Guard to oversee
matters concerning the anchorage of vessels, this duty does
not preclude the Army Corps from supplying their own input,
hence a degree of authority, into the matter. It is, however,
primarily the Coast Guard that extends prevailing power over
the matter.
That it is Coast Guard, rather than Army Corps authority
that is primarily extended over such matters of navigation as
anchoring, is further expressed in the provisions of the Ports
and waterways Safety Act: 1 6 5
The United States Coast Guard [is authorized] to specify
times of movement within ports and harbors, restrict
vessel operations in hazardous areas and under hazardous
conditions, and direct the anchoring of vessels. 1 6 6

Here,

it is specifically stated that it is the duty of the

Coast Guard to "direct the anchoring of vessels". This should
leave no doubt that, while both the Army Corps and the Coast
Guard share a concurrent authority over matters concerning
navigation,
different

this
facets

authority
of

is

navigation.

divided
While

in
the

respect
Army

to

Corps

the
is

involved in the permit process, and seems to be more concerned

165 Ports and waterways safety Act, 49 C.F.R. 1.46 (n).
166 Coast Guard Regulations, 33 C.F.R. Sec. 109.07,
citing Ports and waterways safety Act.
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with physical obstacles to free navigation, the Coast Guard
seems to be more involved with the actual passage of vessels,
their safety, and related regulations of navigation. Hence,
for the purposes of this research, it is the Coast Guard which
should be considered the primary federal regulatory authority.

2) Executive Order #12612 on 'Federalism'
The actual effect of federal authority in resolving the
anchoring

conflict

is

questionable.

This

is

due

to

the

restrictions placed on the preemptive powers of all federal
agencies

through

Executive

Order

12612,

of

October

26,

1987. 1 67 This order mandates that all federal agencies are
to avoid using their preemptive power over state and local
government action. Under this Order, federal agencies may only
preempt where a federal statute contains an express preemption
provision, or where it can be clearly proven that Congress had
intended

to

so

preempt. 168

As

nei ther

courts

nor

legislators have officially associated a federal preemptive
intent with laws which regulate anchoring,
have

no

cause

to

use

their preemptive

federal agencies

powers

over state

anchoring laws.

167 Executive Order 12612, "Federalism", Oct. 26, 1987.
168 Id.
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C. The Coast Guard Legal Opinion

On January 19th, 1993, the Chief of the Coast Guard's
Maritime and International Law Division released a memorandum
which defined the Coast Guard's position towards anchorage
policy. 169

The

memorandum

described

the

results

of

an

eleven month legal review of the anchoring conflict. The legal
review came as a result of a request from the Boat Owners
Association of the united states (BOAT/US).170
The results of the Coast Guard's legal investigation were
mixed;

siding on the behalf of the states on some points,

while also recognizing the constitutional right of the public
to enjoy free

navigation.

Ultimately,

although willing to

provide a legal opinion on the matter, the Coast Guard has
refused to monitor the constitutionality of state laws, or
take any type of legal action against states.
In undertaking the legal study, the Law Division of the
Coast Guard was asked to assess questions from three broad
areas. The areas under question were: (1) to define the limits
on state regulation of anchoring in the navigable waters of
the United states; (2) to assess whether state regulation of

169 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 1.
170 Flannery, "Decision disappoints anchorage rights
groups", Soundings, March, 1993: A4. BOAT/US is one of the
lobbying groups involved in the anchoring conflict.
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navigation

unduly

navigate, and;

(3)

interferes

with

the

pUblic

right

to

exactly when may the Coast Guard act to

ensure freedom of navigation in the navigable waters of the
united

states. 171

These

broad

question

areas

were

subsequently broken down into five specific questions, which
were answered in the memorandum. The five specific questions
appeared as follows:
1. What are
anchoring?172

the

limits

on

state

regulation

over

2. Are the states preempted from regulating anchoring on
the navigable waters of the United states?173
3. Is state regulation of navigation and anchoring
limited by the application of the 'dormant' commerce
clause of the United states Constitution?174
4. Can state regulation of anchoring and navigation
constitute an undue restriction of a boater's right of
free navigation?175
5. Assuming that a state scheme of regulation over
navigable waters of the United states has either run
afoul of a conflicting federal statute or improperly
interferes with interstate commerce,
what is the
obligation of the Coast Guard, representing the federal

171 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 1. The original "call of the
question" was much more broad, and the question areas
represent a revised list of the material originally
requested by BOAT/US. The Coast Guard worked only with the
revised list.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 2.
174 Id. at 5.
175 Id. at 6.
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government, to resolve the conflict?176

In

addressing

the

first

question,

the

Coast

Guard

concluded that the states enjoy a concurrent authority with
the federal government over navigable waters of the United
States,

within

their

authority comes as a

respective

borders.

result of a

This

concurrent

state's inherent police

powers "to prescribe, within limits of the state and federal
constitutions, reasonable regUlations necessary to preserve
the pUblic order, health, safety and morals. ,,177
The exercise of state police power is limited in two
ways.

First,

if

Congress

enacts

a

federal

statute

that

conflicts with state law, federal law preempts the conflicting
state

law.

authority
federal

Second,
is

directly

government

congressional
comrnerce.,,178

that the

exercise of state

limited

because

of

authority
This

by

the

to

congressional

been referred to as a

powers

regUlatory

reserved

"exclusive
regulate

authority

to

the

nature

of

interstate
has

sometimes

"dominant servitude" or a

"superior

navigation easement" .179 Within this study,
to as the "navigation servitude".

it is referred

The navigation servitude

176 Id. at 7.
177 Id. at 1. See also 16A Am. Jur. 2d.,
"Constitutional Law", (1979): 366.
178 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. State
RegUlation", Dec. 30, 1993: 2.
179 rd.
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enables federal authority to supersede state regulations where
such regulations might unduly burden interstate commerce, and
is

applicable

even

where

congress

fails

act. 18 0

to

The

Coast Guard authorities found that the states may regulate
anchoring in their respective waters as a legitimate exercise
of their police powers, provided that such regulations do not
go beyond either limitation on state power. 18 1
The second question taken

into account

in the

Coast

Guard's legal study deals with the issue of whether the states
are

preempted

from

regulating

waters of the united states.
Coast

Guard

pointed

out

anchoring

on

the navigable

In addressing this issue, the
that

the

Supreme

Court

has

traditionally fashioned a two-tier analysis thereof. First,
state

law

is preempted

if

Congress

either expl icitly

or

implicitly evidences an intent to exclusively occupy a given
field. 1 82

Second,

even

if

Congress

has

not

entirely

displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state
law

is

still

conflicts

with

preempted

to

the

federal

law.

In

extent

that

other words,

it

actually

when

it

is

impossible to accommodate both state and federal law, or where
a state law may stand as an obstacle "to the accomplishment of
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. In undertaking this analysis, it must also be
assumed that the historic police powers of the states were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act, unless that was the
clear intent of Congress. (Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
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the full purposes and objectives of Congress", state law is
preempted

by

federal

authority. 183

These

preemptive

stipulations are further restricted by Executive Order 12612
of October 26, 1987, which suggests that preemption of state
law is to be applied jUdiciously in dealing with the states,
and that federal agencies are to avoid direct, overbearing
confrontation. 184
The Coast Guard found that Congress has not demonstrated
an express or implied intent to preempt state regulation of
anchorages. 185

Congress

has,

however,

established

an

extensive scheme of federal regulations over navigation and
navigable waterways. In general, courts which have considered
the

matter

(of

anchorages)

have

generally

concluded that

Congress has not pervaded the field, leaving quite a few areas
open to state regulation. 1 8 6 In fact, Congress has not only
183 Id. at 3. Also see Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v.
state Energy commission, 461 U.S. 191, 103 S.ct. 1713,
(1983) •
184 Executive Order #12612, "Federalism", October 26,
1987 sets forth guidelines regarding the relationship
between federal agencies and the states. Although it
suggests that federal preemption is to be avoided or handled
judiciously, preemption is not prohibited where state action
clearly conflicts with agency policy and actions. Id.
185 In the context of this point, it must be noted that
there is a clear distinction between "anchorages", which is
the SUbject of discussion in the immediate context, and
"anchoring", which mayor may not be an act of navigation.
186 In Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991), the
U.s. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a
city ordinance enacted by the city of Santa Barbara,
affecting vessel moorings was not preempted. The ordinance
required vessels to obtain permission to moor or anchor in a
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failed to pervade the field, but on the contrary has expressly
encouraged the individual states to take a more active role
through the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972

(CZMA).187

In particular, Congress found that it was the national policy
to "encourage the states to balance competing interests among
industry,

national

recreation,

defense,

fisheries,

and

energy".188
In

analyzing

the

question

of

whether

a

state

law

conflicts with federal statutes, the Coast Guard points out
that some observers have cited 33 U.S.C. 471 and 33 C.F.R.
Part 109 as providing the basis for federal preemption of
state
471,

regulation
gives

the

of

anchorage. 1 8 9

Coast

Guard

the

The statute,
authority

to

33

U.S.C.

establish

anchorage grounds in the navigable waters of the united states

designated area, and forbade anchorage in another. The court
held that although federal law regulates much of the
activity on or near navigable waterways, it does not
entirely exclude state or local governments from
supplementing federal regUlations. In reaching its decision,
the court looked at specific regUlations cited by the
plaintiffs. These regulations were the Ports and waterways
Safety Act, s 4, as amended (33 U.S.C.A. s 1223); 33 C.F.R.
165, on special anchorage area regUlations; and 33 C.F.R.
110, on security zone regUlations. The plaintiffs failed to
make any reference to the commerce clause, navigation
servitude, or historical public trust rights, which, if
employed may have had a significant bearing on the court's
decision.
187 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. State
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 4. Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.
188 Id. See also 16 U.S.C. at 1452 (b).
189 Id. at 5.
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whenever such anchorage grounds are in the best maritime or
commercial

interests

navigation. 190

In

of

the

nation

practice,

to

however,

carry
the

out

safe

regulations

promulgated under this authority do not establish a pervasive
system of federal regulation over anchorage. Likewise, federal
law

enables the Coast Guard to establish "special anchorage

areas",

where vessels of less than 65 feet in length may

anchor and are not required to display anchor lights and
shapes,

which

are

ordinarily

required. 19 1

As

long

as

a

state does not purport to regulate the display of lights and
shapes within one of those such "special anchorage areas", it
may enact anchorage regulations without SUbjecting itself to
federal preemption.
The third question addressed by the Coast Guard in their
legal study deals with state regulation of navigation and
anchoring being possibly limited by the application of the
~

commerce

clause

of

the

Constitution.

In

addressing

this

question, the Coast Guard first established that Supreme Court
findings suggest that the federal government has the exclusive
right

to

regulate

navigation,

however

the

Court

also

recognizes that the states have a wide scope for regulating
matters

of

local

nature

which

190 Id.
191 Id.
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may

affect

interstate

commerce. 192
The Coast Guard's review of court interpretations of the
commerce
results.

clause

and

navigational

rights

revealed

mixed

While some court findings hold that the commerce

clause is inapplicable to recreational boating, others concede
that laws which prohibit temporary mooring or anchoring of a
vessel

within

commerce

township

clause,

and

waters

thus

are

in

conflict

inapplicable. 1 9 3

In

with

the

summing up

this issue, the Coast Guard noted that the Supreme court has
invalidated state laws under the commerce clause only when
they

fall

into

three

general

categories:

(A)

laws

that

192 In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9wheat) 1 (1824), the
Supreme court suggested that the federal government had the
exclusive right to regulate navigation. In Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), the Supreme Court
recognized that states may not regulate SUbjects which,
because of the need for national uniformity, demand that
their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single
authority. The Court went on to conclude that state
regulation affecting interstate commerce would be upheld if
the regulatory burden imposed on interstate commerce was
outweighed by the state interest in enforcing the
regulation. This finding may serve to grant the states
considerable authority under their police powers to enact
regulations that impact navigable waters. Id. at 5.
193 In Rentner v. Village of Burnham, 82 Ill. 1175
(1984), boat owners were fighting a mooring fee charged by
the local government. The court held that the commerce
clause was inapplicable to recreational boating in the
immediate context, because the boaters did not cross state
lines. In Bass River Associates v. Mayor of Bass River, 743
F.2d 159 (3rd Cir 1984), the court held that a township's
prohibition of floating homes was not preempted by federal
regulations, however also concluded that the township could
not prohibit temporary mooring or anchoring of a vessel
within townShip waters. The court did not establish any
guidelines which would define exactly how long "temporary"
anchoring or mooring might be.
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arbitrarily or purposefully discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of in-state interests; (B) laws which impose
incidental burdens on interstate and foreign commerce that are
clearly excessive in comparison to the local benefits, and (C)
laws which serve to undermine the federal need for uniformity
among

states

in

particular

areas,

such

as

interstate

transportation and foreign trade. 1 9 4
In analyzing the fourth question, the Coast Guard took
into account the regulation of anchoring and navigation as an
undue restriction of a boater's right of free navigation. This
question provided a relatively favorable outcome on the behalf
of

boaters

and

those

who

do

not

support

anchoring

restrictions.
The Coast Guard found that a state cannot completely bar
the passage of a vessel through concurrent state and federal
waters. 1 9 5 Likewise,

they provided evidence that the right

of navigation includes, as a necessary incident, the right of
anchorage 1 9 6 and that a vessel anchored for up to two years

194 Coast Guard Memo #16501, Dec. 30, 1992: 6.
195 Id at 6. Any navigable waters within state
boundaries are SUbject to both state and federal authority.
In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 97 S.ct. 1740
(1977), the court held that the barring of a -v e s s e l through
concurrent state and federal waters would likely violate the
indisputable precept that no state may exclude federally
licensed commerce.
196 Kuramo v. Hamada. 30 Haw. 841 (1929).
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can still be found to be "in navigation".197 The memorandum
went

on

to

state

that

"any

state

regulation

narrowly

restricting a vessel anchoring in state waters, even on a long
term basis, may well be an unreasonable ban on the right of
free navigation within joint state and federal waters" .198
Case law, however, is "unhelpfully silent on this particular
issue".199
In examining the final question, regarding the statutory
obligation

of

the

Coast

Guard,

representing

the

federal

government, to resolve the anchoring conflict, the legal study
concluded that the Coast Guard has no statutory obligation to
monitor the constitutionality of state laws,

or take legal

action against a state. 2 0 0 Furthermore, the Coast Guard "is
under no affirmative duty to aid private citizens who believe
a state is treading upon a

federally preempted right". 201

The Coast Guard authorities also bear mention of Executive
Order #12612,202 which mandates that all

federal

agencies

197 In U.S. v. Monstad, 134 F.2d 986 (9th Cir 1943),
the court found that a barge anchored in one position for
more than two years without getting underway was "in
navigation:. Id.
198 Id.
199 I d .
200 Id. See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470, U.S. 821, 838
(1985) .
201 I d • at 7.
202 Executive Order #12612, "Federalism", Oct. 26,
1987.
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are to avoid asserting their preemptive powers over state and
local government action. The Order allows preemption claims
only where a federal statute contains an express provision, or
where

there

is

evidence

that

Congress

intended

to

preempt. 203

203 Coast Guard Memorandum #16501, "Federal vs. state
Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992: 7.
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so

CHAPrER IV: THE TEST CASE

A. HNWPS

v.

Hawaii

1) Background of the Case

During the late summer months of 1992, the conflicting
interests between state offices concerned with the regulation
of vessels within state waters,

and boater interest groups

concerned with securing a declaration of a fundamental right
to anchor became the basis of a

legal confrontation.

This

confrontation eventually materialized into the case known as
Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society v.

state of

Hawaii,204

Hawaiian

Navigable

(HNWPS
Waters

v.

Hawaii).

Preservation

The

plaintiff,

Society

(the

Preservation

Society), is a non-profit corporation whose immediate interest
was to stay the enforcement of, if not overturn, Hawaiian laws
which were enacted in order to regulate both mooring and
anchoring. 205
Act 379 of the 1988 Hawaiian Session Laws, provided the
Hawaii Department of Transportation with the authority

to

regulate both anchoring and mooring of vessels within the

204 Hawaiian Navigable Waters Preservation Society v.
State of Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993).
205 I d .
77

state's navigable ocean waters,
In

1991,

some

jurisdictional

and navigable streams. 206

authority

over

recreational

boating was transferred to the Department of Land and Natural
Resources (DLNR).207
In

1991,

the

Hawaii

Department

of

Transportation,

pursuant to its authority under the Hawaii Administrative
Act,208

Procedures
anchoring

and

adopted

mooring

in

similar

state

rules

waters

regulating

(Appendix).209

Subsequently, the Department of transportation was issued a
federal

permit

moorings

at

for

Ke'ehi

the

installation of

Lagoon. 210

Prior

approximately
to

the

grant

360
of

permission for the installation of moorings, Ke' ehi lagoon had
been

established as

a

special

federal

anchorage

zone. 2 1 1

206 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 379, 1988.
207 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 272, 1991.
208 Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act, Haw. Revised
Statutes, 91-1, et seq.
209 Id. Hawaii Administrative Rules regulates small
boat harbors.
210 Ke'ehi Lagoon is located on the island of Oahu,
almost directly between Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. Ironicly,
it is also located relatively close to Kuapa Pond and the
Hawaii-Kai marina, which are to the east of Honolulu. Kuapa
Pond was the area in question in Kaiser Aetna.
211 As mentioned previously in the chapter regarding
the Coast Guard legal review, 33 C.F.R. establishes two
broad classes of anchorage regulations: special anchorage
areas (Subpart A) and anchorage grounds (Subpart B). The
waters of Ke'ehi Lagoon fall under the regulatory
stipulations of SUbpart A, which states:
liThe areas described in SUbpart A of this part are
designated as special anchorage areas pursuant to the
authority contained in an act amending laws for preventing
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Essentially, this allows vessels 65 feet or less in length to
anchor

without

being

required

to

display

a

white

light,

indicating that such vessel is at anchor. It also indicates
that the Coast Guard extended regulatory authority over Ke'ehi
lagoon. Apparently, this extension of federal authority was
thought by the plaintiffs to supercede all state regulations,
and was subsequently one of their points of contention.
In commencing legal
sought

to

challenge

the

action,

the Preservation Society

constitutionality

of

all

Hawaii

regulations and legislation affecting the rights of mariners
to navigate and anchor in the ocean waters surrounding the
islands of Hawaii. They contended that such regulations are
constitutionally infirm, and further argued that Congress has
both exclusive jurisdictional control over such matters, and
has explicitly and implicitly preempted Hawaii's comprehensive
regulatory

regime. 212

In

formulating

their

argument,

the

Preservation Society based their suppositions on the federal
preemptive authority established through the retention of the
navigation

servitude

scheme

special

of

pursuant

to

33

in

the

federal

U. S . C.,

Submerged
anchorage

Section

471,

Lands
grounds
and

Act,213

the

established

federal

safety

collisions of vessels .... Vessels not more than 65 feet in
length, when at anchor in any special anchorage shall not be
required to carry or exhibit the white anchor lights
required by the navigation rules". 33 C.F.R Sect. 110.1 (A).
212 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 4.
213 Id. See also SUbmerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.
at 1301.
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regulations also set forth in 33
Additionally,
regulations

u.s.c.,

Section 1602. 21 4

the Preservation Society contended that the
act

was

an

unconstitutional

restriction

on

interstate commerce. 2 1 5
In evaluating the case, the District Court was of the
opinion that the parties involved had submitted matters beyond
the scope of the pleadings, and therefore would only entertain
motions for summary judgement, rather than judgement on the
pleadings. 21 6 By entering into summary judgement, the court
was able to evaluate the points of contention without the
necessity of having the case heard by a jury. Also, as the
case

was

a

statutory

review,

a

decision

reached

through

summary judgement would enable the plaintiffs to bring the
matter

before

the

9th

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals,

in

San

Francisco, California. 2 1 7
214 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. SUpp. 766 (1993): 4.
215 I d .
216 Rule 56(C) of the Federal Rules of civil Procedure
provides that summary jUdgement shall be entered when:
" ... the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and the admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a jUdgement as a matter of law."
The moving party has the burden of identifying for the
court, those portions of the materials on file that it
believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. Id.
217 Telephone interview with Morgan J.C. Scudi, Huth,
Farmer & Scudi, 5440 Morehouse Dr., suite 4400, San Diego,
CA, 29121, (619) 58-1001, March 18, 1994. Through the
telephone interview, Mr. Scudi indicated that the purpose of
entering into summary judgement was that since this was a
80

2) The Findings of the Court
In examining the case,
define the ways
federal

the court

first

undertook to

in which state laws might be subject to

preemption.

It

defined

this

by

looking

at

the

precedent set by three prior cases: Beveridge v. Lewis,218
Ray

v.

Atlantic

Richfield

Co., 219

and

Rice

v.

Santa

Fe

Elevator corp.220
In Beveridge, the issue at hand was similar to that being
examined in HNWPS v. Hawaii. There, the court sustained the
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance enacted by the city
of Santa Barbara restricting both mooring and anchoring within
the city harbor during the winter months.

In rejecting the

contention that the ordinance was preempted by the Ports and
waterways safety Act 2 2 1 the court adopted the analysis for
preemption which had been previously set forth in Ray. There,
the court began its analysis with the reminder that prior
cases have indicated that when a State's exercise of police

statutory review, their goal was to both have the district
court pass jUdgment on the legal contentions, and be able to
get the case appealed in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Mr. Scudi also indicated that he was of the mind that, based
on its arguments, this case would be decided in favor of the
State of Hawaii.
218 Beveridge v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991).
219 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
220 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1950) .
221 Ports and waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. 1221, et
seq.
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power is challenged as being preempted by federal authority,
"we start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the state were not superseded by the Federal Act, unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of congress.,,222 It
then went on to explain that Congressional purpose may be
evidenced in several ways; the scheme of federal regulation
may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it, or the
Act of Congress may touch upon a field in which the federal
interest

is

so dominant that

the

federal

system will' be

assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. 2 2 3 Thus, the court employed these two measures as
their guidelines by which to determine federal preemption.
In charging that the Hawaiian statutes were sUbject to
federal

preemption

through

the

SUbmerged

Preservation Society invoked Section 1311

Lands
(b)

Act,

the

of the Act,

which reads:

The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto
said States and persons aforesaid, except as otherwise
reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of the
United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands,
improvements, and natural resources .... Nothing in this
sUbchapter ... shall
affect
the
use,
development,
improvement, or control by . .. the United States of
said ... waters for the purposes of navigation .... 224
222 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993). Quoting
Rice.
223 Id. at 4.
224 Id.
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The plaintiffs argued that the provision, a retention of
the navigation servitude, is an expression of Congress' intent
to

retain

exclusive

jurisdiction

over

matters

affecting

navigation. The District Court, however, was of the opinion
that the contention was without merit, and went on to state
that the provisions did not offer any indication that Congress
intended

to

retain

exclusive,

rather

than

concurrent

jurisdiction over navigable waters of the states. 2 25

The

court stated that:

No court has read section 1311 (b) as a manifestation of
Congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
regulation of navigable waters. This is because there is
no reason to suspect that the section is any more than an
expression of the well-established proposition that the
federal government
retains a paramount navigation
servitude in the waters of the states .•.. The retention of
this servitude does not, as plaintiffs suggest, mean that
the federal government has exclusive control over state
waters. All the retention of the servitude means is that
the government may, without payin~ compensation, decrease
the value of riparian property.2 6

The

court

interpreted

the

facts

to

mean

that

the

225 Id. The court stated that "Normally, if the
language of a statute is unambiguous, its plain meaning
controls." this plain language reading is supported by the
legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act as well: the
House Committee reporting on the SUbmerged Lands Act stated:
" ... The bill provides that, except to the extent that
it is exercised in a manner inconsistent with applicable
federal laws, the police power of each coastal state may
extend to that portion of the continental shelf which would
be within the boundaries of such state if extended seaward
to the outer margin of the shelf." H. Rep. No. 215, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953).
226 Id.
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preemptive

effect

of

the

navigation

greater than that of

the

commerce clause,

originates.

Thus,

federal

action

servitude

taken

can be

no

from which

it

pursuant

to

the

navigation servitude preempts state legislation only if such
legislation

is

implicitly or explicitly preempted,

or

in

conflict with federal law. 227 The court found no explicit
or implicit conflicts to exist between the Submerged Lands Act
and the Hawaiian anchoring regulations, thus by itself, the
SUbmerged Lands Act could not sustain a claim of preemption.
The second point brought up by the Preservation Society
was that of federal preemption under the provisions of the
special

federal

contention here

anchorage area in Ke' ehi Lagoon. 2 28 Their
was

that

the

establishment

of

a

special

federal anchorage area is indicative of Congress' extension of
authority over the area, and that as such, additional state
regulations are inherently preempted. In a related argument,
the plaintiffs claimed that the Coast Guard's allowance of
regulatory action within the lagoon by the state constitutes
an impermissible delegation of power. 2 29
As previously stated, the Coast Guard has Congressional
authority to establish two broad classes of anchorage areas.
Namely,
grounds.

these

are

special

anchorage

areas,

and

anchorage

Designation of waters as a special anchorage area

227 Id.
228 Id. at 8.
229 Id.
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allows vessels 65 feet and under the privilege of anchoring
without

the

necessity

of

displaying

anchor

lights. 230

Designation of waters as an anchorage ground establishes such
area as a mooring or anchoring field. As such, it might appear
on a nautical chart as "anchorage", or moorings may be placed
there

pursuant

to

obtaining

a

permit

such. 2 31

for

explained in the Coast Guard legal opinion,

As

the state is

allowed to exercise its police powers over such areas, as long
as the provisions of such powers do not conflict with federal
law. 2 3 2
The court found that there was no actual conflict between
state

and

federal

regulation

in

Ke I ehi

Lagoon,

as

state

regulations did not purport to impose anchor-light regulations
in length in the lagoon. 23 3

on vessels less than 65 feet

The court drew reference to the Coast Guard legal opinion in
stating that local governments may establish, maintain and
charge

reasonable

fees

for

mooring

within

a

federally

designated special anchorage area. 2 3 4
In assessing the Preservation Society I s argument that the
Coast

Guard's

allowance

of

state

regulation

within

the

230 33 C.F.R., Sect. 109.10.
231 Id. at SUbpart (b).
232 Coast Guard Memorandum, #16501, "Federal vs. State
Jurisdiction", Dec. 30, 1992: 5.
233 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 9.
234 Id. Referring to Coast Guard Memorandum, #16501,
"Federal vs. State Regulation", Dec. 30, 1992.
85

designated

special

anchorage

area

was

an

impermissible

redelegation of authority to the state of Hawaii, the court
responded by stating that it could not clearly comprehend the
argument. 235
evidence

It

that

did

the

state,

Coast

however,

Guard

that

abandoned

there
its

was

no

regulatory

authority. 236
The assumption to be made here is that the Preservation
society

believed

regulatory

that

by

stipulations to

allowing
be

any

additional

enacted within

the

state
special

anchorage area, the Coast Guard was ignoring its regulatory
authority. This assumption is supported by a letter issued by
the Coast Guard to the Key West Port and Transit Authority:

Establishing the special anchorage zone places no
obligation for mariners to anchor within it. Mariners are
free to anchor anywhere in navigable waters where the act
of anchoring is not prohibited by federal regulation.
Similarly, vessels anchoring within the anchorage zone
will not be obliged to use the installed moorings. You
may collect a fee from those who choose to use your
moorings, but the mariner is entitled to use an anchor at
no fee and stay in the anchorage zone an indefinite
period. These federal anchorage rights preempt any state
or local statutes or regulations which may conflict with
them. 2 3 7
The statement refers to federal preemption, and seems to
imply

that

the

Coast

Guard,

as

an

arm

of

the

federal

235 Id. at 10.
236 I d .
237 Chief, Seventh Coast Guard Dist., Letter to
Director, Port and Transit Authority of Key West, # 16612,
Sere 1389, Nov. 21, 1991: 1.
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government,

may

extend

their

power

of

preemption

where

additional laws are enacted in special anchorage areas. No
reference to the preceding statement was ever made in HNWPS v
Hawaii. It does, however, represent a valid point which was
never

raised

in

the

telephone interviews,

case.

Court

documents,

as

well

as

did not indicate that the plaintiffs

were aware of the existence of the Coast Guard statement. This
may account for it not being raised as an argument within the
case.
The statement is also significant in that it conveys a
much stronger opinion on anchoring rights than the more recent
Coast Guard legal opinion, discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.
Coast Guard statements which were released prior to the point
at which anchoring laws were first challenged in the federal
court system (marked by the first stage of HNWPS v. Hawaii),
generally take a more assertive view than those which were
sUbsequently written. This is evidenced by the following two
opinions released in 1981:
The Coast Guard also administers anchorage regulations on
the navigable waters of the united states. In order for
states and local governments to establish and regulate
anchorage areas, ~ermission must first be obtained from
the Coast Guard. 2 8
Lt. Griesbaum [indicated that town officials] in Indian
Harbour Beach had absolutely no authority in the waterway
area concerned, that the U. s. Code gave Coast Guard
238 R.C. Branham, Commander, Seventh Coast Guard
District, Letter #16753/1 to Paula Hawkins, united states
Senate, June 22, 1981.
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exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of anchoring in
navigable waters. The Coast Guard, in turn, promulgated
regulations now in the Code of Federal Regulations. The
Coast Guard has not and will not delegate their authority
to anyone. However, Griesbaum said we would not get a
written answer from the Admiral commanding 7th District
because of the helpful and extensive cooperation the
Coast Guard gets and must have from the state, County and
Municipal authorities in the matter of speed limits,
pollution,
illegal
netting,
boat
inspections
and
registrations, and other law enforcement functions in the
waterway areas which the Coast Guard simply cannot meet
alone. 23 9

The shift in assertive opinions may be best explained
through the following Coast Guard memorandum,

released in

1992:
The title and opening paragraph of the article [reference
to article in "Boaters' Monthly", Feb. 1992] suggest that
the Coast Guard will take a proactive legal role to keep
states or municipalities from enacting or keeping
anchorage regulations. That is not the case. If a
conflict is shown to exist between federal law and state
or local anchoring regulations, then you are correct in
stating that federal law will prevail. However, the Coast
Guard has taken a long-standing policy of not commenting
on the legality of state or local regulations if there is
no direct conflict with federal law or regulations
administered by the Coast Guard. No existing federal
statute or court decision definitively states that local
anchorage regulations - even those prohibiting anchoring
- exceed the states' authority to exercise their police
powers. Therefore, the courts, not the Coast Guard, must
rule that a conflict exist[s] before federal preemption
can occur. 2 4 0

239 John Barnett, Office of the Florida state Attorney,
Memorandum addressed to W.J. Patterson, March 20, 1981.
240 R.D. Peterson, Seventh Coast Guard District,
Memorandum #16617 to Valerie Jones, Concerned Boaters, March
6, 1992.
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Here, Coast Guard opinions more closely reflect those of
the legal opinion described in Chapter 3. As there are no
documents which definitively state the reasons for a change in
the

assertive

character

of

Coast

Guard

opinions,

the

conclusion to be drawn here is that the Coast Guard is acting
within the policy of "not commenting on the legality of state
or local regulations where there is no direct conflict with
federal law or regulations administered by the Coast Guard".
As the anchoring conflict is currently under the jUdicial
scrutiny

of

the

federal

courts,

and

no

federal

statute

expressly states that the individual states may not regulate
anchoring, the legality of such laws is still questionable,
and a firm statement by the Coast Guard could potentially bias
the opinions of the courts.
The next argument brought to consideration by the court
was that of the Hawaiian regulations being too narrow in scope
to allow for an acceptable degree of vessel safety. In support
of their argument,

the plaintiffs cited 33 C.F.R.

section

2030. 2 4 1 This section provides in part that:

A vessel at anchor shall exhibit where it can best be
seen:
(i) in the fore part, an all-around white light or one
ball; and
(ii) at or near the stern and at a lower level than the
light prescribed in SUbparagraph (i), an all-around white

241 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 10.
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light. 2 42
Apparently,

the plaintiffs read these regulations to

imply that a vessel would necessarily have to be manned in
order to adequately display such anchor lights,
Hawaiian

law

impinged

on this

supposition.

and that

Section 2030,

however, does not require anchored vessels to be constantly
manned.
The court found that on an ordinary, clear night, the
maintenance of a proper anchor light is the only precaution
necessary to warn other vessels,
requirement

which

the

mariner

and as such is the only
must

meet. 2 4 3

The

court

further went on to state that even if federal regulations did
create some duty to maintain an overnight presence on a vessel
at anchor, there is no evidence that this is in conflict with
Hawaiian law. 244 Hawaiian law provides for liveaboard fees
to be paid by individuals using a moored vessel as a place of
habitation. 245

principal

As

there

is

no

obligation for one to live aboard one's vessel,

statutory
the court

reasoned that there is likewise no obligation for the mariner
to

pay

a

liveaboard

fee. 2 4 6

Hawaiian

regulations

242 rd. at 10. citing 33 C.F.R. section 2030.

243 r d .
244

rd .

245 HRS Section

266-21.

246 rd.
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do

not

prohibit a person from living aboard a vessel, however they do
establish a scheme of fees to be paid if one chooses to live
aboard a vessel.
In denouncing this contention,

the court stated that

" ... the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs indicate nothing
more than the
having

to

fact that plaintiffs are dissatisfied with

pay the

mooring

fees

charged

by

the

state

of

Hawaii. ,,247
Next,

the court undertook to examine the question of

implicit federal preemption through the sources cited by the
plaintiffs. Again,

relying heavily on Beveridge, the court

noted that:

Just because Congress has intended to reduce the
possibility of cargo and vessel loss, prevent damage to
structures on or near navigable waters, ensure that
vessels comply with certain standards, and just because
it believes that navigation and vessel safety and
protection of the marine environment are matters of major
national importance does not mean that the [state] is
completely trammeled in all regulatory efforts. 2 48
The court went on to state that although it is undisputed
that the Secretary of Transportation and the Coast Guard have
extensive authority to regulate anchoring,
movement

of vessels,

these

powers

are

mooring and the

discretionary.

The

authorities may act to affect any of the afore-mentioned

247 I d .
248 Id. at 11. Noting that which was found in
Beveridge.
91

navigational issues, but they are not required to do so. Thus,
the court concluded that the Submerged Lands Act and the
provisions cited within 33 U.S.C. do not implicitly preempt
the regulatory scheme of Hawaiian anchorage laws.
Finally, the court took into consideration the argument
that

Hawaiian

regulations

act

as

an

unconstitutional

restriction on interstate commerce. The Preservation Society
had asserted that all vessels entering Hawaii are engaged in
interstate commerce. Although they cited no authority, it may
be presumed that their contention was based on the fact that
travel to the state of Hawaii necessitates passage over the
high

seas,

and

likewise,

travel

among

the

islands

also

periodically requires passage over the high seas. Typically,
the

federal

government

is

the

regUlatory

authority

over

transportation over the high seas. The court found no evidence
to

indicate

that

unconstitutional

Hawaiian

burden

on

anchorage
interstate

laws

act

commerce.

as

an

This

is

primarily because the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence
which would support such an argument.
In

reaching

this

decision,

the

court

first

cited

a

previous Hawaiian case, Matson Navigation v. Hawaii Pub. Utile
Comm.,249 in which the court held that the State of Hawaii
may regulate transportation among the islands, as long as such
regUlations are not in conflict with any existing federal

249 Matson Navigation v. Hawaii Pub. Utile Comm., 742
F. Supp. 1468, 1484 (D. Haw. 1990).
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regulations. 25 0

Although

the

court

also

recognized

that

Congress has the power, under the commerce clause, to regulate
commerce involving navigable and international waters (high
seas), this power does not preclude the state of Hawaii from
regulating commerce between places within the state solely
because it involves such waters. The court stated that:

To hold that the state of Hawaii may not regulate
transportation between islands, even where there is no
federal regulation, merely because such transportation
passes over the high seas, would in effect place Hawaii
on a different footing than the rest of the states in the
union. It would also create an anomalous situation where
such shipping and shippers would in fact be wholly
unregulated to the severe detriment of the people of
Hawaii. 251
Although the court conceded that the instant regulations
may act to create an indirect burden on interstate commerce by
regulating the mooring of vessels that at some time originated
out of the state, such regulation is "permissible if the state
regulates evenhandedly, has a legitimate interest, and the
local

benefits

commerce". 25 2

As

outweigh
the

the

burden

Preservation

evidence showing that the

interstate

on

Society

produced

no

state had regulated mooring or

anchoring in an unreasonable manner,

the court found their

argument without merit.

250 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. SUpp. 766 (1993).
251 Id. at 13.
252 Id.
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Thus,
imposing

the court upheld the authority of the state in
the

noted

restrictions

on

vessels

within

its

navigable waters:

The court finds that the state of Hawaii has a legitimate
interest in insuring the safe use of ports by
recreational boaters and that the contested regulations
are rationally related to this objective. HRS Sections
200-4 and 200-6 were established to avoid conflicting
uses between recreational ocean users and vessels
conducting passive mooring and anchoring activities. The
state concluded that such conflicting uses posed a
substantial threat to public safety because of the heavy
water traffic at Ke'ehi Lagoon. The court finds that this
response was not irrational. 2 5 3
The

court

likewise

would

not

grant

the

plaintiffs'

request to stay the enforcement of the Hawaiian laws until
such time as the matter would be heard before the Court of
Appeals. 254

As

of

the

time

when

undertaken and the results printed,

this
the

research

was

case was pending

appeal in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco,
California and no hearing date had yet been determined. 2 5 5

253 I d . at 14.
254 In order for a court to grant a motion to stay
enforcement of laws pending a legal review, the moving party
must be able to show (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) the
existence of serious questions going to the merits and the
balance of hardships tipping in its favor. The court was not
of the opinion that the forthcoming legal appeal would
satisfy either of these requirements. Id. at 15-16.
255 Telephone conversation with agent in charge of
docketing, San Francisco Cir. ct. of App., March 29, 1994.
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B. Review of HNWPS v. Hawaii

In HNWPS v. Hawaii, the logic which was used by the court
to

arrive

at

conclusions

seems

to

have

been

correctly

employed; the court made reasonable conclusions based on the
material

which

Ordinarily,

was

such

satisfactory.

presented

means

Specific

of

by

the

passing

statutes,

parties

jUdgement

legal

and

involved.
would

be

historical

doctrines, and case history may be available to provide the
court

with

interpreting

a

clear
a

set

conflict,

of

guidelines

comparing

it

to

follow

when

to

others,

and

ultimately reaching conclusions. Thus, legal conclusions may
be reached by repeatedly casting one's bucket into the well of
existing knowledge. with regard to the anchoring conflict,
however, the well of knowledge is surprisingly shallow. Very
little case history exists which would aid legal interpreters
in being able to reach conclusions based on prior fact, and
the

body of legislative

piecemeal

at

best. 2 5 6

In

coverage

is commonly held

reviewing HNWPS

v.

to be

Hawaii,

the

court may have correctly interpreted the letter of the law,
where such letter was provided, however the review may also
have been too narrow in scope to correctly evaluate the spirit
256 Elaine Dickinson, Assistant Vice President of
Boat/U.S. Telephone Interview of March 16, 1994. Ms.
Dickinson's views of a "piecemeal" legislative body are
descriptive of the views of most of the parties with whom
the researcher has likewise conversed.
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question was not established by the Coast Guard as a security
zone. 2 6 1 Thus, the immediate laws may be seen as the city's
exercise of police power in promoting what it believes to be
the public good.
As in HNWPS v. Hawaii, the plaintiffs were a group of
owners of boats which were either anchored or moored within
the

prohibited

area.

Likewise,

they

sued

the

city

for

injunctive relief based on the premise that the regulations
were

preempted

by

federal

law. 2 62

The

court

dismissed

charges of federal preemption, and upheld the validity of the
city ordinance. 2 6 3 The validity of the court's decision may
be questioned,

however,

when compared to a

similar,

more

recent ruling handed down by a Florida circuit court. This
ruling overturned a

local ordinance which,

like the Santa

Barbara ordinance, allowed anchoring in an area at certain
times, yet prohibited it during others. 2 64
At the heart of the Florida case was a challenge to a
park ordinance, enacted in the John Pennekamp Coral Reef State
Park,

prohibiting anchoring at night.

The regulations were

enacted to prevent environmental damage: specifically damage
261 Id.
262 In addressing the question of federal preemption,
the plaintiffs based their argument primarily on preemption
under the Ports and waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C.A. ss
1221 et. seq. Id. at 1.
263 Id.
264 Boat US Reports, "Judge Throws Out Anchoring
Restriction", Vol. XXIX, Jan. 1994: 3.
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public safety.269 However,

in neither instance do the case

reports indicate that these assertions were substantiated by
fact. This would indicate that the court's decisions may have
been flawed.
While

the

challenge the

plaintiffs

in

HNWPS

constitutionality

of

v.
all

Hawaii

sought

to

Hawaiian anchorage

laws, the only ones which were examined by the court were HRS
200-4

and

HRS 200-6 2 7 0•

Ignored

by the

court

were

other

laws, which may contradict some of the legal findings in the
immediate case. 2 7 1 One law of concern is HRS 266-21, which
provides:
(1) No more than fifteen percent of the respective total
moorage space available .•• at the Ala Wai and Ke'ehi boat
harbors [be available] for liveaboard purposes.
(2) [permit application, mooring and liveaboard fees]
shall be higher for non-residents [of the state of
269 In HNWPS v. Hawaii, the court stated that:
" ... Hawaii has a legitimate interest in insuring the safe
use of ports by recreational boaters and that the contested
regulations are rationally related to this objective ... [the
ordinances] were established to avoid conflicting uses
between 'recreational ocean users and vessels conducting
passive mooring and anchoring activities." HNWPS v. Hawaii,
823 F. Supp. 766 (1993): 14. Although the court cites the
reasons for the enactment of the ordinances under question,
nowhere in the case report is there evidence that the state
provided proof to SUbstantiate these assertions. Likewise,
in Beveridge v. Lewis, the case report indicates that the
ordinance under question was enacted largely lito protect
[the waterfront facilities] from possible damage." Beveridge
v. Lewis, 939 F.2d 859 (1991): 29. Again, nowhere in the
report is there proof to substantiate the assertion.
270 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F.Supp. 766 (1993).
271 The court did not examine Haw. Rev. stat. 266-21.13.
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a common law right of access to the ocean. Although they did
not

argue

their

case

as

one

involving

the

public

trust

doctrine, the court supplied the view that the "pUblic trust
doctrine dictates that a beach and ocean waters must be open
to all on equal terms and without preference and that any
contrary state or municipal action is impermissible.,,275
Likewise,

in a

similar New Jersey case,

Brindley v.

Borough of Lavalette,276 the court held that the borough,
by maintaining a boardwalk, pavilions, and bathing facilities,
had acquired a public easement for recreational purposes by
adverse users. Thus, an ordinance discriminating against nonresidents was held void. 277
In HNWPS v. Hawaii, the court "relied very heavily on the
Coast

Guard

[legal]

opinion"

in

drawing

many

of

its

conclusions. 27 8 One of the provisions of the Coast Guard
legal

opinion

is

a

section

which

delineates

under

what

circumstances the Supreme Court has previously invalidated
state laws through the power of the commerce clause. Included
in

these

circumstances

are

"laws

which

purposefully

or

arbitrarily discriminate against interstate commerce in favor

275 I d . at 47.
276 Brindlev v. Borough of Lavalette, 33 N.J. Super.
344 (1954).
277 Id.
278 Flannery, "Judge upholds Hawaii anchoring law",
Soundings, May, 1993: A8. Quoting Katherine Bell-Moss,
attorney for the Preservation Society from San Diego.
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attorneys involved in challenging anchoring laws, and has also
organized

a

battery of

attorneys

currently

working

on

a

voluntary basis on HNWPS v. Hawaii.
A similar conversation with Elaine Dickinson, Assistant
Vice President of Boat/US,

a national boater lobby group,

provided additional insights into the absence of the public
trust

doctrine

in

challenging

anchoring

laws.

Dickinson

indicated that her group preferred not to invoke the public
trust, based on it's "nebulous character". She went on to say
that inconsistencies in its interpretation by different courts
could potentially undermine her group's contentions. Likewise,
she pointed out that the inherent cost of bringing a public
trust challenge to trial would be impractical: " ... because of
its nebulous character, a public trust challenge could take
ten years and cost well over a hundred-thousand dollars to
resolve, and even then we're not sure what the outcome will
be. ,,283 Boat/US
in

getting

investigation

is the lobby group which was instrumental

the
into

Coast
state

Guard

to

versus

conduct
federal

their

regUlation

anchoring.

283 Telephone interview with Elaine Dickinson,
"Boat/U.s.", March 16, 1994.
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legal
of

C. The Future of HNWPS v. Hawa i i

Thus far,

HNWPS v. Hawaii has been heard only at the

district court level. This is representative of the first
stage

in

a

potentially

long

legal

process

which

could

ultimately result in the case being heard before the Supreme
court of the united States.
Essentially, the united States jUdicial system is a dualcourt

system. 2 8 4 The

Constitution

cases may be heard under the

dictates what

types

jurisdiction of the

of

federal

courts. Included here are admiralty and maritime cases, cases
reviewing

the

actions

of

certain

federal

administrative

agencies,

civil suits under federal law, and cases arising

under the Constitution, the laws of the united States, and
treaties. 2 8 5

By

implication,

matters

not

assigned

to the

federal courts through the Constitution are heard in the state
courts. 'Th e question in HNWPS v. Hawaii clearly falls within
the parameters of federal court authority, thus, focus is on
the judicial process of the federal,

rather than the state,

jUdicial system.
There are three components of the federal court system,
284 James Wilson, American Government: Institutions and
Policies, Lexington, Mass., 1989: 400.
285 The Constitution of the United States, Article III,
Sept. 17, 1787, and Eleventh Amendment, 1795.
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the first of which is the network of District Courts. There is
one District Court in each of the 94 United states districts,
and these courts are entrusted with original jurisdiction over
matters brought before them. 2 8 6 District Courts do not have
the power to hear appeals. The immediate case has already been
heard before a District Court.
The second component in the federal court system is the
network of Circuit Courts of Appeals. There are a total of
twelve

of

these

courts,

regional circuits,

representing

each

of

the

eleven

and the District of Columbia. 2 8 7 Courts

of Appeals hear only appeals from Federal District Courts,
U.s. regulatory commissions, and certain other federal courts.
The majority of cases heard in the Courts of Appeals begin in
the Federal District Courts. 2 8 8 Currently,
is

slated to be heard before the

Appeals

in

San

Francisco,

Ninth

California,

HNWPS v.

Hawaii

Circuit Court

but

as

of

yet,

of
no

hearing date has been determined. 2 8 9
The third component in the federal court system is the
Supreme Court of the united States.

The Supreme Court may

extend original jurisdiction over cases involving conflicts
between two or more states, the united states and a state,

286 Wilson, American Government, Lexington, 1989: 401.
287 rd.
288 rd. at 40.
289 Telephone Conversation with Clerk's Office, 9th
Cir. ct. of App., San Francisco, Ca., March 30, 1994.
106

foreign ambassadors and other diplomats, and a state bringing
action

against

a

citizen

of

another

state. 2 9 0

The

court

also has, under certain circumstances, appellate jurisdiction
over cases coming from the lower federal courts or the highest
state court. 2 9 l As HNWPS v. Hawaii is not representative of
an issue over which the Supreme court may extend original
jurisdiction, the only way it may find itself there is through
the court's appellate jurisdiction.
There are essentially two routes by which HNWPS v. Hawaii
may end up in the Supreme Court. One is by an appeal, while
the other is by a writ of certiorari. There are only a few
matters which may qualify for an appeal.

In general, these

involve clear constitutional issues, such as when a federal
court has found a federal law to be unconstitutional, or has
found a state law to be in conflict with federal laws or the
constitution,

or likewise,

when it has upheld a

state law

against a claim that it is in violation of a federal law or
the

constitution. 292

HNWPS

v.

Hawaii may

clearly qualify

for an appeal under these circumstances.
The more common route to the Supreme Court is through a
writ of certiorari.

This

is a process by which the court

makes, as the Latin word suggests, an issue "more certain".
This procedure may be invoked when the decision of a Federal
290 wilson, American Government, Lexington, 1989: 401.

291 I d .
292 Id. at 402.
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court of Appeals involves the interpretation of a federal law,
or the constitution. Either side involved in a case may ask
the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court may use its
discretion in deciding whether or not to grant it. 29 3 As
HNWPS v. Hawaii involves the interpretation of the scope of
the navigation servitude (as set forth in the Submerged Lands
Act), the Supreme Court may be asked to hear the case through
a writ of certiorari.
Although the immediate case does seem to qualify to be
heard before the Supreme Court through both of the appellate
routes, the overall chances of cases making it that far are
quite slim.

Only about ten percent of the Supreme Court's

cases arrive by appeal, while roughly ninety-five percent of
the requests for certiorari are rejected. 2 9 4 Likewise,

the

costs of having a matter heard in the federal courts are high,
as are the costs of appeal, lawyers fees, certiorari costs,
copies of court records, petitions, and other miscellaneous
matters. The hinderance imposed by cost is compounded by the
amount of time involved in resolving an issue in the federal
courts. Ultimately, although HNWPS v. Hawaii may end up before
the Supreme Court,

the process is both long and complex,

ensuring that the issue will not be resolved in any short
period of time.

293 Id.
294 Id. at 402, 403.
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CHAPl'ER V: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

In review of the data which has been compiled thus far,
it

is

now

possible

to

begin

to

analyze

the

hypotheses

previously delineated in Chapter 1. It is the goal of the
forthcoming chapter to provide the synthesis by which the
relevant data may be used to either support or undermine the
hypotheses. The hypotheses purport that:
1. Anchoring can be proven to be an act of navigation.
2. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in
HNWPS v. Hawaii, unnecessarily restrict interstate
commerce.
3. Laws which restrict anchoring, such as those noted in
HNWPS v. Hawaii, unnecessarily restrict pUblic rights
associated with the pUblic trust doctrine.
4. State-imposed anchorage laws which unnecessarily
restrict interstate commerce or pUblic trust rights will
be deemed unconstitutional.

B. Anchoring within the purview of navigation

One of the issues lying at the heart of the anchoring
conflict has to do with the definition of 'navigation', and
more

specifically,

definition.

It

has

the

relationship

already

been

109

of

anchoring

established

to

that

that

free

navigation is ensured under federal protection. The federal
navigation servitude (Chapter II, section B), the offspring of
the commerce clause within the United states Constitution,
gives paramount right to the federal government to compel the
removal

of any

obstruction to navigation.

The

navigation

servitude is sUbsequently codified through the Submerged Lands
Act

(Chapter

III,

section

A).

The

jurisdictional use of said lands

Act,

though

granting

to the individual states,

provides that:
The united states retains all of its navigation servitude
and rights in and powers of regulation and control of
said lands for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation~
national
defense
and
international
affairs. 29 :>
Although it has already been established that anchoring
is an activity associated with pUblic trust rights (Chapter
II, section A), anchoring as a right under the pUblic trust
doctrine may be substantially reinforced by its association
with

navigation,

a

more

traditional

public

trust

right.

Traditional rights enjoyed by the pUblic in pUblic trust areas
are those of fishing, fowling, navigation and recreation. The
association
navigation

of
shall

public

trust

be discussed

rights
at

a

with
further

anchoring
stage

and

of the

analysis. At this juncture, it is more important to delineate
exactly how anchoring is an act of navigation, while keeping
in mind the significance of that association with factors such
295 Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C., section
1314 (a).
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as the navigation servitude and public trust doctrine.
In Chapter I, section B, six legal cases are discussed
which both expand the definition of navigation and associate
anchoring with such a definition. These cases are Bowen v.
Hope, The Idaho, Locke v. state, Sayer v. State, United states
v. Monstad, and Kuramo v. Hamada. Each one of these cases is
significant in supporting the premise that anchoring is an act
of navigation. In Bowen, the earliest of the cases, a vessel
anchored while at sea was shown to be engaged in navigation.
The association between anchoring and active navigation was
subsequently echoed in Monstad, wherein a vessel anchored for
a

period of more than two years was

also held to be

in

navigation. Of further importance in Monstad is the fact that
a time-frame was established, during which the vessel never
ceased to be engaged in navigation. As the court held that the
anchored

vessel

was

in

navigation

for

a

period

of

approximately two years, such legal precedent may be used in
the

future

to

challenge

time

limitations

which

could

be

associated with anchoring laws.
In both Bowen and Monstad, the issue central to the case
was whether an anchored vessel was engaged in navigation. in
both cases, the individual courts ruled that anchored vessels
were

in fact engaged in navigation.

directly

with

navigation,

the

other

question
cases,

of

such

While the cases deal

anchoring
as

Sayer

indirectly provided opinions on the matter.
111

as
and

an

act

Kuramo

of
have

In Sayer, the issue central to the case involved a boat
which was moored at a terminal, rather than anchored. Although
the

act

of

mooring

a

vessel

at

a

terminal

differs

SUbstantially from that of anchoring, the court addressed the
definition of navigation and held it to include anchoring.
Likewise,

in

Kuramo,

although

the

issue

was

one

of

an

individual's attempt to establish exclusive rights over a
parcel of SUbmerged land, the court examined the question of
navigation,

and ruled that

it

includes,

as

incident,

the

anchoring of a vessel.
Research has resulted in the finding of at least four
legal cases which specifically state that a vessel which is
lying at anchor is actively engaged in navigation. Not only do
these cases support the premise that anchoring is an act of
navigation,

but

they are

also

indicative

of

a

degree

of

consistency in the evaluation of such a question. consistency
in

interpreting

the

definition

of

navigation

to

include

anchoring is significant in that it sets a logical path by
which courts have and should continue to define one of the key
elements in the anchoring issue.
While the four previously mentioned cases deal with the
association of anchoring to navigation, two other cases also
discussed in Chapter I, Section B, deal with the expansion of
the term 'navigation'. This expansion includes factors other
than

anchoring,

but

which

are

still

of

significance

in

understanding the scope of navigation and how the broadened
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scope might affect anchoring laws. These two cases are The
Idaho, and Locke.
In

The

navigation
journey.
cargo,

Idaho,
to

the

include

court

expanded

activities

the

definition

incidental

to

of

making

a

Such activities

include taking on passengers and

stowage of cargo,

and the general management of a

vessel.

Subsequently,

in Locke,

the

court

held

that

the

definition of navigation can include a period of time, such as
when a vessel is passing through a canal, when the vessel is
sUbject to the actions of people not even aboard the vessel at
such time. These cases signify the expansion of the definition
of navigation, and might prove useful in the resolution of
future issues.
The

evidence which has

been

compiled

indicates that

anchoring can be proven to be an act of navigation. This is in
support of the first hypothesis. The fact that vessels which
are at anchor are engaged in navigation is perhaps one of the
most significant findings of the study . Primarily,

this is

because the incorporation of anchoring within the definition
of navigation creates the potential for legal interpreters and
policy-makers to expand the jurisdictional authority of the
federal navigation servitude, the SUbmerged Lands Act, and the
pUblic trust doctrine to specifically encompass anchoring. As
all

of

these

navigation,

legal

guides

and as anchoring

protect

the

right

of

free

is an act of navigation,

it

follows that anchoring is implicitly, a federally protected
113

right. This is of importance in analyzing the validity of
state-imposed anchorage laws, and ultimately deciding whether
such laws are constitutional.
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C. Anchoring laws as restrictions on interstate commerce

The importance of maintaining free channels of interstate
commerce has long been recognized by the federal government.
The federal navigation servitude (Chapter II, Section B) gives
the federal government a paramount right to compel the removal
of

any

obstructions

to

navigation

in

order

to

ensure

unrestricted interstate commerce. This power is derived from
the commerce clause of the Constitution.
The link between interstate commerce and navigation was
established in Gibbons v. ogden,296 where the Supreme Court
defined the nature of interstate commerce as comprehending
navigation. As the definition of navigation has likewise been
shown to comprehend anchoring, it follows that anchoring is
incidental to interstate commerce. In this respect, laws which
restrict anchoring may also restrict interstate commerce. The
constitutionality of anchoring laws may be determined based on
the relationship of such laws with interstate commerce.

If

anchoring laws are restrictive of interstate commerce, then
such laws would logically be unconstitutional. If, however,
anchoring laws do not restrict interstate commerce, then such
laws may indeed be justifiable extensions of state authority.
Although the immediate purpose is to determine whether or not
anchoring laws, such as those noted in the test case, serve to
296 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
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(9 Wheat) 23

(1824).

restrict interstate commerce, the broader implications of the
results of such a determination should be kept in mind during
this stage of the analysis.
In the test case (Chapter IV, section C), the District
Court examined some, but not all of Hawaii's statutes which
affect anchoring and navigation. In reviewing the case, the
court admitted that the regulations which were noted (HRS 2004 and HRS 200-6),

may have created an indirect burden on

interstate commerce. While the court went on to state that
"such

regulation

is

permissible

evenhandedlY",297

it

failed

if

the

state

regulates

to acknowledge other Hawaiian

laws which regulate in an inequitable manner.
One law which was not examined by the court in the test
case is HRS 266-21. This statute establishes guidelines for
higher application fees, mooring fees and liveaboard fees for
non-residents of Hawaii than for residents. Other Hawaiian
statutes, such as HRS 200-6, require that a permit be obtained
in order to legally anchor a vessel

in the waters of the

state. As a non-resident is required to pay more for a permit
application than a resident, it is evident that the state is
not regulating in an evenhanded manner. In fact, through the
regulatory

scheme,

the

state

has

set

up

a

discriminates against non-residents of Hawaii,

system

which

favoring in-

state interests. This, using the logic of the court, creates
an anomalous situation, constituting an impermissible burden
297 HNWPS v. Hawaii, 823 F. Supp. 76,
116

(1993): 13.

on interstate commerce.

Likewise,

it is in support of the

premise that laws which restrict anchoring,
noted

in the test case,

such as those

unnecessarily restrict interstate

commerce.
In

the

legal

opinion

of December,

1992

(ChapterIII,

section C), the Coast Guard addressed the question of state
regulation of navigation being limited by the application of
the federal navigation servitude. The Coast Guard noted that
the

Supreme

Court

has

invalidated

state

laws

under

the

commerce clause when such laws fall into three categories: (a)
laws that arbitrarily or purposefully discriminate against
interstate commerce in favor of in-state interests; (b) laws
which impose incidental burdens on interstate commerce, which
are clearly excessive in comparison to the local benefits; and
(c)

laws

uniformity

which

serve

among

to

states

undermine
in

the

particular

federal
areas,

need
such

for
as

interstate transportation and foreign trade. It can be argued
that the Hawaiian regulatory scheme touches upon each one of
these points.
In light of discrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of in-state interests,

is the fact that the Hawaiian

statutes treat vessels traveling among the islands as if they
were not engaged in interstate commerce, when in fact such
travel often necessitates passage over international waters.
While such vessels may not have traveled to another state
before re-entering Hawaiian waters, they may still be engaged
117

in interstate commerce for the purpose of the law. This is
largely based on the decision handed down
Village of Burnham,298
court

held

that the

(Chapter III,
commerce

in Rentner v.

Section C). Here, the

clause

was

inapplicable

to

vessels operating solely within the waters of a state. Had the
vessels simply left the waters of the state,

the commerce

clause would have applied to such vessels.
In one respect, this argument may be countered by noting
the court's decision in Matson Navigation v. Hawaiian Public
utile Comm .. 299 In Matson, the court held that the State of
Hawaii may regulate transportation among the islands,

even

though

over

such

transportation

often

involves

travel

international waters. The court reached this decision based on
the premise that if the State of Hawaii was not able to
regulate intrastate travel,

it would be placed on unequal

footing with the rest of the states. However, in reference to
the points raised in the Coast Guard opinion, to hold that a
state may
where

such

extend regulatory authority over transportation
transportation

takes

place

over

international

boundaries would itself create an anomolous situation and set
Hawaii

apart

from

the

rest

of

the

states.

This

could

potentially serve to undermine the need for uniformity among
states in particular areas, such as interstate transportation
298 Rentner v. Village of Burnham, 82 N.D.III. 1175
(1984).
299 Matson Navigation v. Hawaii Pub. utile Corom., 742
F. Supp. 1468 (1990).
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and

foreign

trade.

Thus,

the

Hawaiian

regulatory

scheme

touches upon two of the ways in which the Supreme Court has
invalidated state laws under the commerce clause.
A third link may be drawn by noting the high fees which
are

charged

by

the

state

to

mariners

seeking

anchoring

permits, moorings, and liveaboard privileges. Under HRS 26621,

permit application fees

are

in excess of one-hundred

dollars for non-residents, while liveaboard fees may be over
three times that amount

for the same group.

This may be

indicative of incidental burdens which are clearly excessive
in

comparison

to

the

local

benefits.

If

so,

it

would

constitute another point under which the Supreme Court has
typically

invalidated

commerce clause.

state

laws

through

the

While the statistical data

use

of

the

and economic

indicators necessary to validate this point were not a facet
of the immediate research, an analysis of fees collected by
the state with respect to their local benefits should be
considered as a SUbject
A final

which merits further research.

restriction on

interstate commerce which

is

evident in the laws noted in the test case is the seventy-two
hour time limit imposed on vessels within Hawaiian waters. In
Bass River Associates v.

Mayor of Bass River 30 0

(Chapter

III, section C), the court concluded that the township could
not prohibit temporary anchoring of vessels within township

300 Bass River Associates v. Mayor of Bass River,
F.2d 159

(1984).
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743

waters,

as

preemption.

such

anchoring

However,

the

is
court

protected
did

not

under

federal

establish

any

guidelines which would define exactly how long "temporary"
anchoring might be. If the precedent established in Monstad,
where a vessel was still actively engaged in navigation after
being anchored for two years,
context,

then

a

seventy-two

is applied in the immediate
hour

time

I imit

may

further

exacerbate the burden placed on interstate commerce by the
Hawaiian statutes.
In

conclusion,

evidence

indicates

that

laws

which

regulate anchoring, such as those noted in HNWPS v. Hawaii,
unnecessarily restrict interstate commez-ce , This is in support
of the second hypothesis,

and necessary in order to draw

conclusions as to the constitutionality of such laws.
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D. Anchoring laws as restrictions of public trust rights

The pUblic trust doctrine (Chapter II, section A) is one
of the oldest roots of modern common law. HistoricallY, pUblic
rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation have

been held to

be nearly sacrosanct in pUblic trust areas. In recent times,
the scope of the public trust doctrine has been expanded to
include both recreation and anchoring as additional pUblic
trust rights. Public trust areas include navigable waters of
the united states and the lands underlying those waters up to,
in almost all cases, the mean high tide line. 3 0 1 In theory,
this

makes

almost

every

location

that

a

vessel

could

conceivably anchor sUbject to the public trust.
Both the existence of the pUblic trust doctrine as a
facet of constitutional law, and its significance in enabling
the federal government to use powers of preemption over state
legislative acts, were affirmed in Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v.

Illinois

(Chapter II, Section A). A major result of

Illinois Central was the legal recognition of pUblic trust
rights

to

submerged lands.

Again,

this

is

important with

regard to anchoring laws, as the entire act of anchoring, from
traveling

over

navigable

waters,

to

dropping

an

anchor

301 Most states recognize private property rights only
over lands landward of the mean high tide line.
Massachusetts, however, recognizes private property
interests landward of the low tide line.
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overboard

and

having

it

ultimately

come

to

rest

on

the

submerged lands, is within the purview of public trust rights.
state action and laws which run contrary to the principles of
the public trust doctrine act as a detriment to the public
interest,

and

have

unconstitutional.

typically

This

concept

been

should

found
be

kept

to
in

be
mind

throughout this stage of the analysis, as it will ultimately
help to answer the question of the constitutional status of
anchoring laws.
within the immediate context, the pUblic trust doctrine
is important in addressing anchoring laws in respect to the
pUblic rights of navigation, anchoring, and recreation.
Laws which affect anchoring implicitly affect the pUblic
right of navigation through the association of anchoring as an
act of navigation. In this respect, laws which place burdens
on anchoring likewise place burdens on the right of free
navigation. Aside from being an act of navigation, anchoring
has also been upheld to be a pUblic trust right. In King v.
Oahu Land and Railway Co.
3),

the

court

recognized

(Chapter II, section A, Subsection
that

pub Ld,c

trust

uses

include

navigation, sailing and anchoring, while in Kuramo v. Hamada,
the court held that the right of navigation includes the right
of anchoring. These cases are of major significance to the
test case. Hawaii has a history of both recognizing the pUblic
trust

doctrine

incorporating

as

a

factor

in shaping Hawaiian

anchoring within
122

the

law,

and

realm of pUblic trust

rights.

Any attempt by the state to restrict these rights

represents a significant departure from historic practice.
The existence of recreation as a public trust right has
been affirmed in numerous legal cases. In Marks v. Whitney
(Chapter II,

section A,

Subsection 2),

the court included

recreation as a pUblic trust right, while in Orion Corp v.
Washington, the court stated that public trust rights include
navigation,

fishing,

swimming,

waterskiing,

and

other

recreational purposes. It is almost inconceivable to exclude
sailing and other manifestations of water-bourne travel from
the purview of recreational activities.
such as Hawaii,

Indeed, in a state

where tourism is a major industry,

it is

hardly arguable that the majority of mariners plying the
waters of the state are engaged in some form of recreation.
Hawaiian anchorage laws set up a scheme by which permit
and fee arrangements are established for both recreational and
commercial vessels anchoring within the waters of the state.
seventy-two hour time-limits have also been established, and
a

discriminatory

fee

system

between

residents

and

non-

residents has likewise been codified into law. It is evident
that all of these state-sanctioned regUlations impinge upon
and unnecessarily restrict rights associated with the pUblic
trust doctrine.
The

imposition

of

a

time-limit

on

the

anchoring

of

vessels within navigable waters is akin to placing a limit on
the ammount of time that a bather may use a public beach. Such
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regulation constitutes an intrusion into federally protected
pUblic trust rights. In the test case, neither the court nor
the legislative history behind the Hawaiian statutes indicates
the necessity of imposing a limit on the amount of time that
a vessel may anchor. Thus, the exercise of state police power
in promoting the publ Lc good is not justified in the immediate
context. In this sense, laws which regulate the amount of time
that a vessel may anchor,

such as those noted in the test

case, unnecessarily restrict rights associated with the pubLi.c
trust doctrine.
Permit

requirements

and

fee

arrangements are another

means by which the statutes enacted by the state of Hawaii
have

affected

rights

associated

with

the

pUblic

trust

doctrine. By requiring a permit in order to anchor a vessel,
the state has created a system in which the activity requires
an official sanction in order to be legal. The extension of
state authority and imposition of incidental burdens on a
pUblic right reduces the degree of freedom with which that
right may be enjoyed.

Such a burden may be a

justifiable

extension of a state I s police power if there is clear evidence
that such a burden is necessary in order to preserve the
pUblic good.

As research has not revealed a need for such

regulation, then the requirement of permits in order to anchor
is not justified. Hence,

laws which stipulate that permits

must be obtained in order to legally anchor a vessel, impose
an unnecessary restriction on a pUblic right associated with
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the public trust doctrine.
The fee arrangements enacted by the state of Hawaii are
likewise an intrusion on public trust rights. While fees may
typically be charged by state agencies for purposes such as
motor vehicle registration, such fees are permissible, as the
associated activity is more of a privilege than a public trust
right.

By

implication,

fees

are

intrinsicly

exclusive

in

nature, as bUdget limitations may not allow an individual to
afford the luxuries which are tied to said fees.

Thus,

to

impose a fee arrangement as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of
a pUblic right creates a situation in which members of the
pUblic may be excluded from enjoying what would ordinarily be
their right. This undermines the purpose of the public trust
doctrine and runs contrary to state interests in promoting the
pUblic good.
The

fee

arrangement

system

in

Hawaii

is

SUbject

to

further scrutiny by virtue of the fact that a discriminatory
regime has been established in which non-residents are SUbject
to pay more than residents for the permits which are required
in order to legally anchor a vessel. Case history indicates
that such laws seldom stand up to jUdicial scrutiny. This was
indicated in Matthews (Chapter II, Section A, Subsection 2),
where

the

court

ruled

that

fee

arrangements

could

not

discriminate in any way between residents and non-residents.
Likewise,

in Avon,

the New Jersey Supreme Court prohibited

municipalities from charging higher fees to non-residents than
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to residents for the use of city beaches. The conclusion in
both of these cases was reached by examining the relation of
local

ordinances

statutes,

to

the

pUblic

trust

doctrine.

Hence,

Hawaii,

further

such as those noted in HNWPS v.

impose unnecessary restrictions on pUblic rights associated
with

the public trust doctrine by discriminating between

residents and non-residents.
In conclusion,
noted

in

the

test

it is evident that laws such as those
case

unnecessarily

restrict

rights

associated with the public trust doctrine. This is in support
of the third hypothesis. Furthermore, in light of prior case
history, it is unlikely that laws which discriminate between
residents and non-residents,

such as those enacted by the

state of Hawaii, shall withstand jUdicial scrutiny if argued
as cases involving the pUblic trust doctrine.
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E. The constitutionality of anchoring laws

The remaining question to be answered deals directly with
the

question

of

constitutionality

and

whether

anchoring

regulations are permissible or unconstitutional. As no legal
precedent has been set which would provide a direct answer to
such a question, conclusions must be drawn independent of such
data. The evaluative case study method of research, which has
been employed thus far in reaching conclusions, is especially
important

in

the

immediate

instance.

This

is

because

it

involves description, explanation and jUdgement of previously
delineated facts.

Judgement,

in the immediate instance,

is

interpretive. Hence, conclusions shall suggest, but not prove
the

ultimate

outcome

of

the

constitutionality

question.

Judgement is reached by examining the association of anchoring
laws

to

the

navigation

servitude

and

the

pUblic

trust

doctrine, both of which have been shown to be major factors by
which previous constitutionality issues have been resolved.
In section B of this chapter, the premise that laws which
restrict anchoring unnecessarily restrict interstate commerce
was substantially validated. In this respect,

state-imposed

anchoring laws are incongruent with the federal navigation
servitude. Supreme court history indicates that where state
law comes into conflict with the federal navigation servitude,
such laws are typically invalidated as being repugnant to the
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constitution.

This

was

made

evident

in

Gibbons

v.

Ogden

(Chapter II, section B), where a New York state law was held
to undermine the principles set forth in the commerce clause,
and hence deemed unconstitutional. Applying the principles set
forth in Gibbons to the immediate case, it is likely that laws
which

restrict

anchoring

will

be

judged

to

be

unconstitutional, as they can be shown to restrict interstate
commerce.
The public trust doctrine is another means by which the
constitutionality of this issue may be jUdged. In Section C of
this chapter, anchoring laws, such as those noted in HNWPS v.
Hawaii, were shown to place unnecessary restrictions on rights
associated

with

the

public

trust

doctrine.

As

with

the

navigation servitude,

when state legislation impinges upon

public trust rights,

such legislation has been previously

found to be unconstitutional. This was established in Illinois
Central (Chapter II, section A, Subsection 2), where a state
grant of submerged lands was found to be contrary to state
interest in protecting the public trust, and rights inherent
in that trust.

Laws which similarly restrict public trust

rights were likewise found to be unconstitutional in cases
such as Matthews, and Avon. Hence, applying the principles set
forth in these cases to the laws which have been discussed in
the test case, it is likely that such laws will be jUdged as
being unconstitutional, as they can be shown to unnecessarily
restrict rights associated with the pUblic trust doctrine.
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As
research

previously
is

analysis.

mentioned,

especially

Not

the

important

only does

case
to

study

this

method

stage

of

it allow jUdgement based

of
the

on the

description and explanation of facts, but it also functions as
a

means

of

examining

a

specific

instance

in

order

to

illuminate a general problem. In this case, HNWPS v. Hawaii is
the specific instance wherein the general problem of stateimposed laws which restrict anchoring is illuminated. Applying
the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the test case to
the broader national arena,

it is evident that any state-

imposed law unnecessarily restricting the right of a mariner
to

anchor,

serves

as

an

unnecessary

restriction

of

both

interstate commerce and pUblic trust rights. In this respect,
and in support of the final hypothesis, such laws will in all
likelihood be deemed unconstitutional.
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F. Conclusions

In recent history, there has been a trend on the behalf
of both state and federal agencies to gradually extend their
jurisdictional and regulatory powers over waters which are
increasingly further from the shore. As a nation, the United
states has extended its regulatory authority from an original
three-mile

territorial

sea

with

an

adjacent

nine-mile

contiguous zone, to a current twelve-mile territorial sea with
an adjacent one hundred eighty-eight mile exclusive economic
zone. Through legislation such as the Submerged Lands Act, the
individual

states

have

likewise

enjoyed

an

increasingly

broader scope of jurisdictional control over coastal areas. As
there has typically been a tendency for other coastal nations
to follow the precedent in coastal policy set by the united
states, the result is a movement of creeping jurisdiction, and
the ultimate loss of the traditional high seas.
The loss of the traditional high seas as a result of
creeping

jurisdiction

may

be

likened

traditional rights, such as anchoring,

to

the

loss

of

by the enactment of

state laws which are increasingly affecting the purview of
such

rights.

Similarly,

such

laws

run

contrary

to

the

traditional values delineated through the Constitution, the
cornerstone of American legal policy. If the remaining coastal
states and states bordering navigable waterways enact laws
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similar to those which currently exist in the state of Hawaii,
it is conceivable that traditional rights of navigation, like
the high seas, could be increasingly lost. In this respect, it
is important to monitor the implications of state-imposed laws
affecting navigation, in order to assess their congruency with
existing federal and constitutional policy.
It

is

evident

that

state-imposed

regulations

which

unnecessarily restrict the right of mariners to anchor within
the navigable waters of the United states are not legitimate
extensions of state authority,

but rather unconstitutional

restrictions of navigation. As such, the federal government
has the power under the navigation servitude to preempt such
laws. This power is primarily in the hands of the Coast Guard,
but is limited by the imposition of Executive Order #12612
(Chapter III, Section C). The federal government may act to
preempt such laws, but only after the courts have stated that
anchoring is within the purview of the navigation serVitude.
until such time, the only challenge to anchoring laws can come
from

individual

citizens

and

public

interest

groups.

Similarly, anchorage laws may be invalidated through the use
of the public trust doctrine. While there exists a potentially
strong public trust case against such laws, the drawback to a
pUblic trust challenge lies in the nebulous character of the
trust,

and

the

high

amount

of

monetary

and

professional

resources needed to effectuate such a challenge.
It is the opinion of the researcher that the interests of
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all parties involved would be better served by attempting to
resolve the matter through more interactive channels, such as
through

proper

coastal

zone

management.

As

discussed

in

Chapter I, the interests in the coastal zone are both wide and
varied,

so

that

the

intrinsic

nature

of

coastal

zone

management is to provide some sort of balance in attempting to
meet these needs. The enactment of legislation without taking
into account the often divergent needs which are placed on the
coastal zone often result in conflicts, such as those which
currently exist between boater groups and the state of Hawaii.
Proper coastal zone management may be the most effective means
by which the resolution of these issues can come to fruition.
One example of how the anchoring conflict may be better
resolved through coastal zone management can be seen in the
state of Florida. Here, the coordination of efforts between
state

and

boater

interest

groups

establishment of three potential

has

resulted

in

the

state-wide uniform plans

currently under consideration by state legislators.
Florida's
characterized
differing

restrictive
as

laws

stemming
enacted

by

anchorage
from

a

policies
"patchwork

different

have

been

quilt"

of

municipalities. 302

Negotiations have resulted in the creation of at least three
potential options in establishing a uniform state-wide policy.
The first option would allow boaters to anchor their vessels

302 Boat/U.S. Reports, "Uniform Anchoring Guidelines
Make Headway", November, 1993: 1
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without

restriction

for

up

to

fourteen

days

during

any

consecutive three-month period in a particular county. After
the expiration of the fourteen day grace period, the vessel
would have to be moved to a state-designated anchorage which
may be managed by local government. 3 0 3 Under this option,
local governments would be precluded from adopting a more
restrictive anchorage pOlicy than those allowed by the state.
The second option would allow vessels to be anchored
without restriction except in areas designated as restricted
zones. Restricted zones would be established only for water
quality and/or habitat protection, protection of endangered or
threatened species, ensuring equitable use of waterways by
different

users,

preventing

navigation,

and

would

preclude

also

public

health

local

or
or

minimizing

hazards

safety.304

This

governments

from

to

option

establishing

restricted or prohibited areas, unless first approved by the
state.
The third option would allow vessels to anchor for up to
six months without restrictions in all waterways, except those
mentioned in the second option. Vessels anchored for more than
the six month per year limit would be required to use a
managed anchorage. 3 05
At this point, state officials are leaning towards the
303 Id.
304 Id., at 8.
305 Id.
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second option. 3 06 This is perhaps the most wise route to
follow, as restrictions on time-limits for the anchorage of
vessels could potentially lead to legal action challenging the
constitutional i ty of such regulations,
perpetuation of the anchoring conflict.

306 Id.
134

and the SUbsequent

APPENDIX

HAWAII REVISED STATUTE (DRS) 190-4.5: Anchoring, boating, and
mooring in marine life conservation distructs; rules.

(a) The department [DLNR] shall, pursuant to chapter 91, adopt
rules for the regulation of anchoring and mooring in each
marine life conservation district established under this
chapter.
(b) within its jurisdiction over ocean recreational boating
and coastal activities, the department [DLNR] shall adopt
rules pursuant to chapter 91 for the regulation of boating in
each marine life conservation district established under this
chapter.
HRS 200-4: Ocean recreation and coastal area rules.

(a) The chairperson may adopt rules necessary:
(1) To regulate the manner in which all vessels may enter the
ocean waters and navigable streams of the state, and moor,
anchor, or dock at small boat harbors, launching ramps, and
other boating facilities owned or controlled by the state;
(2) To regulate the embarking and disembarking of passengers
at small boat harbors, launching ramps, other boating
facilities, and public beaches;
(3) For the safety of small boat harbors, launching ramps,
and other boating facilities, the vessels anchored or moored
therein;
(4) for the conduct of the pUblic using small boat harbors,
launching ramps and other boating facilities owned or
controlled by the state;
(5) To ' regulate and control recreational and commercial use
of small boat harbors, launching ramps and other boating
facilities owned or controlled by the state and the ocean
waters and navigable streams of the state;
(6) To prevent the discharge or throwing into small boat
harbors, launching ramps, or other boating facilities, ocean
waters and navigable streams, of rUbbish, refuse, garbage or
other substances likely to affect the quality of the water or
that contribute to making the small boat harbors, launching
ramps, other boating facilities, ocean waters, and streams
unsightly, unhealthy, or unclean, or that are liable to fill
up, shoal, or shallow the waters in, near, or affecting small
boat harbors, launching ramps, and other boating facilities
and the ocean waters of the state, and likewise to prevent the
escape of fuel or other oils or substances into the waters in,
near, or affecting small boat harbors, launching ramps, or
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other boating facilities and the ocean waters and navigable
streams of the state from any source point, including, but not
limited to, any vessel or from pipes or storage tanks upon
land. The rules may include:
(A) Requirements for permits and fees for:
(i) The mooring, docking or anchoring of recreational and
commercial vessels at small boat harbors, launching ramps, and
other boating facilities; or
(ii) other uses of these facilities;
(B) Requirements for permits and fees for use of a vessel as
a principal place of habitation while moored at a state small
boat harbor;
(C) Requirements governing:
(i) The transfer of any state commercial, mooring, launching,
or any other type of use or other permit, directly or
indirectly, including, but not limited to, the imposition or
assessment of a business transfer fee upon transfer of
ownership of vessels operating commercially from, within or in
any way related to the state small boat harbors; and
(ii) The use of state small boat harbors, launching ramps, or
other boating facilities belonging to or controlled by the
state, including, but not limited to, the establishment of
minimum amounts of annual gross receipts required to renew a
commercial use permit, and conditions under which a state
commercial, mooring, launching, or any other type of use or
other permit may be terminated, canceled or forfeited; and
(D) Any other rule necessary to implement this chapter
pertaining to small boat harbors, launching ramps, and other
boating facilities belonging to or controlled by the state;
(7) To continue the ocean recreational and coastal area
programs and govern the ocean waters and navigable streams of
the state, and beaches encumbered with easements in favor of
the pub Li,c to help foster and protect public peace and
tranquility and to promote public safety, health and welfare
in or on the ocean waters. The rules may include:
(A) Regulating the anchoring and mooring of vessels,
houseboats, and other contrivances outside of any harbor or
boating facility, including:
(i) The designation of offshore mooring areas;
(ii) The licensing and registration of vessels, houseboats,
and other contrivances: and the issuance of permits for
offshore anchoring and mooring of vessels, houseboats or other
contrivances: and
(iii) The living aboard on such vessels, houseboats or other
contrivances while they are anchored or moored within the
ocean waters or navigable streams of the state.
HRS 200-6: Limitation of private use of ocean waters and
navigable streams.
(a) No person shall erect or place any structure or similar
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object, or sink any type of watercraft or other sizable
object, or abandon any type of watercraft or other sizable
object, either sunk or unsunk, on or within the ocean waters
or navigable streams of the state without a written permit
from the department [DLNR]. The department may require any
person violating this section to remove any structure, similar
object, watercraft, or other sizable object on or within the
ocean waters or navigable streams of the state. If any person
fails to remove the same within the time limit set by the
department, the department may effect the removal and charge
the person with the cost thereof. The department may enforce
compliance with this section by the use of any appropriate
remedy including but not limited to injunction or other
equitable or legal process in the courts of the state.
(b) No person shall anchor, moor, or otherwise place any
vessel, houseboat, or other contrivance on or within the ocean
waters or navigable streams of the state without a permit from
the department. This section shall not apply to :
(1) Vessels owned by the United states;
(2) Vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Pleasure craft or fishing vessels anchored for a period
of less than 72 hours.
HRS 200-9: Purpose and use of state small boat harbors.
state small boat harbors are constructed, maintained and
operated for the purposes of:
(1) Recreational boating activities,;
(2) Landing of fish; and
(3) Commercial vessel activities.
For the purpose of this section, "recreational boating
activities" means the utilization of watercraft for sports,
hobbies or pleasure, and "commercial vessel activities" means
the utilization of vessels for activities or services provided
on a fee basis. To implement these purposes, only vessels in
good material and operating condition that are regularly
navigated beyond the confines of the small boat harbor, and
which are used for recreational activities, the landing of
fish or commercial vessel activities shall be permitted to
moor, anchor, or berth at such harbour or use any of its
facilities. Vessels used for purposes of recreational boating
which are also the principal habitation of the owners shall
occupy no more than one hundred twenty-nine berths at Ala Wai
boat harbor, and thirty-five berths at Ke'ehi boat harbor,
which is equal to fifteen percent of the total moorage space
Which was available as of July 1, 1976, at the Ala wai and
Ke'ehi boat harbors. Notwithstanding the purposes of small
boat harbors, moorage for commercial vessels and commercial
vessel activities is not permitted in the Ala wai and Ke'ehi
boat harbors.
HRS 266-3: General harbor rules.
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(a) The director or transportation may adopt rules as
necessary to:
(1) regulate the manner in which all vessels may enter and
moor, anchor, or dock in the commercial harbors, ports, and
roadsteads of the state, or move from one dock, wharf, pier,
quay, bulkhead, anchorage, or mooring to another within the
commercial harbors, ports, and roadsteads.
HRS 266-13: Dockage.
All watercraft lying idle alongside any wharf, pier,
bulkhead, quay, or landing belonging to or controlled by the
state, and all watercraft discharging passangers or recieving
passangers or freight while made fast or lying alongside the
same, shall pay to the department of transportation such rates
of dockage as shall be fixed by the department.
All watercraft that receive or discharge freight or
passengers (1) from or upon any wharf, pier, quay, bUlkhead,
or landing by meand of lighters, or otherwise, while lying at
anchor or under steam in any bay, harbor, or roadstead, or
(2)
while lying in any slip
or dock belonging to or
controlled by the state shall pay such rates of dockage as
shall be fixed by the department. Any watercraft that leaves
any such wharf, pier, bulkhead, quay, landing, slip, dock,
basin, or waters without paying it dockage and other charges,
with the intent to evade the payment thereof; shall be liable
to pay double rates.
HRS 266-21: Liveaboards.
(1) No more than fifteen percent of the respective total
moorage space available at the Ala wai and Ke'ehi boat harbors
shall be designated for liveaboard purposes.
(2) Permit application fees, mooring fees and liveaboard fees
shall be higher for non-residents of the state than for
residents ... and such permit application fee shall be not less
than one hundred dollars for non-residents.
(3)
If a vessel is used as a principal habitation, the
permittee shall pay a liveaboard fee in addition to the
moorage fee. The liveaboard fee shall be not less than two
times the moorage fee i~ the permittee is a state resident,
and not less than three times the moorage fee if the permittee
is a non-resident. 3 07

307 Hawaii Revised statutes, Division 1, Title 12,
subtitle 8, Chapter 190, Section 4.5; Chapter 200, Sections
4, 6, and 9; Chapter 266, Sections 3, 13, and 21: 1993.
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